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Abstract
Higher-level cognition depends on the ability to learn models of the world. We can characterize
this at the computational level as a structure-learning problem with the goal of best identifying
the prevailing causal relationships among a set of relata. However, the computational cost
of performing exact Bayesian inference over causal models grows rapidly as the number of
relata increases. This implies that the cognitive processes underlying causal learning must be
substantially approximate. A powerful class of approximations that focuses on the sequential
absorption of successive inputs is captured by the Neurath’s ship metaphor in philosophy of
science, where theory change is cast as a stochastic and gradual process shaped as much by
people’s limited willingness to abandon their current theory when considering alternatives as
by the ground truth they hope to approach. Inspired by this metaphor and by algorithms for
approximating Bayesian inference in machine learning, we propose an algorithmic-level model
of causal structure learning under which learners represent only a single global hypothesis that
they update locally as they gather evidence. We propose a related scheme for understanding
how, under these limitations, learners choose informative interventions that manipulate the
causal system to help elucidate its workings. We find support for our approach in the analysis
of three experiments.
KEYWORDS: active learning; causal learning; theory change; resource rationality; intervention
2
Running head: NEURATH’S SHIP
By adulthood, a normal person will have developed a sophisticated and structured under-
standing of the world. The “blooming buzzing confusion”(James, 1890, p462) of moment-to-
moment sensory experience will have given way to a more coherent dance of objects and forces,
relata and causal relationships. Such representations enable humans to exploit their physical
and social environments in flexible and inherently model-based ways (Dolan & Dayan, 2013;
Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2007; Sloman, 2005). An important question, therefore is how people
learn appropriate causal relationships from the data they gather by observing and manipulat-
ing the world. Much recent work on causal learning has used Pearl’s (2000) causal Bayesian net-
work framework to demonstrate that people make broadly normative causal inferences based
on cues like observed contingencies or the outcomes of interventions, which are manipulations
or tests of the system (e.g. Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2009; Holyoak & Cheng, 2011; Lagnado &
Sloman, 2004, 2006; Lagnado, Waldmann, Hagmayer, & Sloman, 2007). Related work has be-
gun to explore how people engage in “active learning” – selecting interventions on variables in
systems of interest in order to be effective at reducing uncertainty about the true causal model
(Bramley, Lagnado, & Speekenbrink, 2015; Coenen, Rehder, & Gureckis, 2015; Sobel & Kushnir,
2006; Steyvers, Tenenbaum, Wagenmakers, & Blum, 2003).
Models of human causal learning based on Bayesian networks have tended to focus on
what Marr (1982) called the computational level. This means that they consider the abstract
computational problem being solved and its ideal solution rather than the actual cognitive
processes involved in reaching that solution – Marr’s algorithmic level. In practice the demands
of computing and storing the quantities required for exactly solving the problem of causal
learning are intractable for any non-trivial world and plausibly-bounded learner. Even a small
number of potential relata permit massive numbers of patterns of causal relationships. More-
over, real learning contexts involve noisy (unreliable) relationships and the threat of exoge-
nous interference, further compounding the complexity of normative inference. Navigating
this space of possibilities optimally would require maintaining probability distributions across
many models and updating all these probabilities whenever integrating new evidence. This
evidence might in turn be gathered piecemeal over a lifetime of experience. Doing so effi-
ciently would require choosing maximally informative interventions, a task which poses even
greater computational challenges: consideration and weighting of all possible outcomes, under
all possible models for all possible interventions (Murphy, 2001; Nyberg & Korb, 2006).
In order to understand better the cognitive processes involved in learning causal relation-
ships, we present a detailed exploration of how people, with their limited processing resources,
represent and reason about causal structure. We begin by surveying existing proposals in the
literature. We then draw on the literature on algorithms for approximating probabilistic in-
ference in computer science using these to construct a new model. We show that our new
model captures the behavioral patterns using a scalable and cognitively plausible algorithm
and explains why aggregate behavior appears noisily normative in the face of individual het-
erogeneity.
Many existing experiments on human causal learning involve small numbers of possible
structures, semi-deterministic relationships and limited choices or opportunities to intervene.
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These constraints limit the computational demands on learners, and thus the need for heuris-
tics or approximations. Further, in most existing studies, subjects make causal judgments only
at the end of a period of learning, limiting what we can learn about how their beliefs evolved
as they observed more evidence, and how this relates to intervention choice dynamics. One ex-
ception is Bramley, Lagnado, and Speekenbrink (2015), which explored online causal learning
in scenarios where participants’ judgments about an underlying causal structure were repeat-
edly elicited over a sequence of interventional tests. Another is Bramley, Dayan, and Lagnado
(2015), which built on this paradigm. Both papers explained participants’ judgments with ac-
counts that are not completely satisfying algorithmically, lacking cognitively plausible or scal-
able procedures that could capture the ways in which judgments and intervention choices devi-
ated from the rational norms. Here, we develop the algorithmic level account and demonstrate
that it outperforms or equals competitors in modelling the data from both previous papers and
a new experiment.
The resulting class of algorithms embodies an old idea about theory change known as the
Duhem–Quine thesis (Duhem, 1991). The idea can illustrated by a simile, originally attributed
to Otto Van Neurath (1932) but popularized by Quine, who writes:
“We [theorists] are like sailors who on the open sea must reconstruct their ship but are never able to
start afresh from the bottom. Where a beam is taken away a new one must at once be put there, and for
this the rest of the ship is used as support. In this way, by using the old beams and driftwood the ship
can be shaped entirely anew, but only by gradual reconstruction.” (1969, p3)
The Neurath’s ship metaphor describes the piecemeal growth and evolution of scientific theories
over the course of history. In the metaphor, the theorist (sailor) is cast as relying on their
existing theory (ship) to stay afloat, without the privilege of a dry-dock in which to make
major improvements. Unable to step back and consider all possible alternatives, the theorist
is limited to building on the existing theory, making a series of small changes with the goal of
improving the fit.
We argue that people are in a similar position when it comes to their beliefs about the causal
structure of the world. We propose that a learner normally maintains only a single hypothesis
about the global causal model, rather than a distribution over all possibilities. They update
their hypothesis by making local changes (e.g. adding, removing and reversing individual
connections, nodes or subgraphs) while depending on the rest of the model as a basis. We show
that by doing this, the learner can end up with a relatively accurate causal model without ever
representing the whole hypothesis space or storing all the old evidence, but that their causal
beliefs will exhibit a particular pattern of sequential dependence. We provide a related account
of bounded intervention selection, based on the idea that learners adapt to their own learning
limitations when choosing what evidence to gather next, attempting to resolve local rather than
global uncertainty. Together, our Neurath’s ship model and local-uncertainty-based schema for
intervention selection provide a step towards an explanation of how people might achieve a
resource rational (Griffiths, Lieder, & Goodman, 2015; Simon, 1982) trade-off between accuracy
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and the cognitive costs of maintaining an accurate causal model of the world.
The paper is organized as follows. We first formalize causal model inference at the com-
putational level. We then highlight the ways in which past experiments have shown human
learning to diverge from the predictions of this idealized account, using these to motivate two
causal judgment heuristics proposed in the literature: simple endorsement (Bramley, Lagnado,
& Speekenbrink, 2015; Fernbach & Sloman, 2009) and win-stay, lose-sample (Bonawitz, Deni-
son, Gopnik, & Griffiths, 2014) before developing out own Neurath’s ship framework for belief
change and active learning.
We next show that participants’ overall patterns of judgments and intervention choices are
in line with the predictions of our framework across a variety of problems varying in terms
of the complexity and noise in the true generative model, and whether the participants’ are
trained or must infer the noise.
We then compare models at the individual level, showing that all three causal-judgment
proposals substantially outperform baseline and computational level competitors. While our
Neurath’s ship provides the best overall fit, we find considerable diversity of strategies across
participants. In particular, we find that the simple endorsement heuristic emerges as a strong
competitor. We provide additional details about the formal framework and model specification
in the Appendix. Also, where indicated, additional figures are provided in Supplementary
materials at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/lagnado-lab/el/ns sup.
A computational-level framework for active structure learning
Before presenting our theoretical framework, we lay out our computational-level analysis of
the problem of structure learning. This can be broken down into three interrelated elements: (1)
representing causal models (2) performing inference over possible models given evidence (ob-
servations and the outcomes of interventions), and (3) selecting interventions to gather more
evidence and support this inference. We introduce the three elements here, providing more
detail where indicated in Appendix A.
Representation
We use a standard representation for causal models – the parameterized directed acyclic
graph (Pearl, 2000, see Figure 1a). Nodes represent variables (i.e. the component parts of a
causal system); arrows represent causal connections; and parameters encode the combined
influence of parents (the source of an arrow) on children (the arrow’s target)1. Such graphs
can represent continuous variables and any form of causal relationship; but here we focus on
systems of binary {0 = absent, 1 = present} variables and and assume generative connections
– meaning we assume that the presence of a cause will always raise the probability that the
effect is also present.2
1Following standard graph nomenclature, we will often refer to the space between a pair of nodes in a model as an
“edge”, so that an acyclic causal model defines each edge as taking one of three states: forward →, backward ←, or
inactive ∅.
2It is worth noting that these graphs cannot naturally represent cyclic or reciprocal relationships. However, there
are various ways to extend the formalism as we discuss in General Discussion, and our theory is not fundamentally
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We also adopt Cheng’s Power PC (1997) convention for parameterization, which provides
a simple way to capture how probabilistic causal influences combine. This assumes that causes
have independent chances of producing their effects, meaning the probability that a variable
takes the value 1 is a noisy-OR combination of the power or strength wS of any active causes of
it in the model (we assume that this value is the same for all connections), together with that of
an omnipresent background strength wB encapsulating the influence of any causes exogenous
to the model. We write w = {wS , wB}. The probability that variable x takes the value 1 is thus
P (x = 1|pa(x),w) = 1− (1− wB)(1− wS)
∑
y∈pa(x) y (1)
where pa(x) denotes the parents of variable x in the causal model (see Figure 1a for an exam-
ple). For convenience, we assume w is the same for all components.3
Inference
Each causal modelm over variablesX with strength and background parametersw, assigns
a probability to each datum d = {x . . . z}, propagating information from the variables that are
fixed through intervention c, to the others (see Figure 1b). The space of all possible interven-
tions C is made up of all possible combinations of fixed and unfixed variables, and for each
intervention c the possible data Dc is made up of all combinations of absent/present on the
unfixed variables. We use Pearl’s Do[.] operator (Pearl, 2000) to denote what is fixed on a given
test. For instance, Do[x= 1, y = 0] means a variable x has been fixed “on” and variable y has
been fixed “off”, with all other variables free to vary4. Interventions allow a learner to over-
ride the normal flow of causal influence in a system, initiating activity at some components
and blocking potential influences between others. This means they can provide information
about the presence and direction of influences between variables that is typically unavailable
from purely observational data (see Bramley, Lagnado, & Speekenbrink, 2015; Pearl, 2000, for
a more detailed introduction), without additional cues such as temporal information (Bramley,
Gerstenberg, & Lagnado, 2014). For instance, in Figure 1b, we fix y to 1 and leave x and z
free (c = Do[y = 1]). Under the x → y → z model we would then expect x to activate with
probability wB and z with a probability of 1− (1− wB)(1− wS).
In total, the probability of datum d, given intervention c, is just the product of the probabil-
ity of each variable that was not intervened upon, given the states of its parents in the model
P (d|m,w, c) =
∏
x∈(X/∈c) P (x|{d, c}pa(x),w). (2)
where {d, c}pa(x) indicates that those parents might either be observed (part of d) or fixed by
the intervention (part of c).
In fully Bayesian inference, the true model is considered to be a random variable M . Our
tied to a particular representation.
3We also restrict ourselves to cases without any latent variable, although we note that imputing the presence of
hidden variables is another important and computationally-challenging component of causal inference (Buchanan,
Tenenbaum, & Sobel, 2010; Kushnir, Gopnik, Lucas, & Schulz, 2010).
4We include the pure observation Do[∅] in C.
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x
z y
wB wS
wB
wB
wS
0  1-wB      (1 - wB)(1 - wS)
1    wB      1 - (1 - wB)(1 - wS)
y       x= 0       x=1
0 1 - wB     (1 - wB)(1 - wS)
1   wB      1 - (1 - wB)(1 - wS)
z      y= 0                 y=1
x
0 1-wB
1  wB
a) b)
x
y=1z wS
wB
wB
0    (1 - wB)(1 - wS)
1  1-(1 - wB)(1 - wS)
z              y=1
x
0 1 - wB
1   wB
p(d|m) = p(x) p(y|x) p(z|y) p(d|m) = p(x) p(z|y=1)
Figure 1: Causal model representation. a) An example causal Bayesian network, parametrized with strength wS and
base rate wB . The tables give the probability of each variable taking the value 1 conditional on its parents in the model
and the omnipresent background noise rate wB . b) Visualization of intervention Do[y = 1]. Setting y to 1 renders it
independent of its normal causes as indicated by the scissors symbols.
prior belief P (M) is then an assignment of probabilities, adding up to 1 across possible models
m ∈ M in the set of models M. When we observe some data D = {di}, associated with
interventions C = {ci}, we can update these beliefs with Bayes theorem by multiplying our
prior by the probability of the observed data under each model and dividing by the weighted
average probability of those data across all the possible models:
P (m|D,w;C) = P (D|m,w;C)P (m)∑
m′∈M P (D|m′,w;C)P (m′)
. (3)
We will typically treat the data as being independent and identically distributed, soP (D|m,w;C) =∏
i P (d
i|m,w; ci).
If the data arrive sequentially (as Dt = {d1, . . . ,dt}; and similarly for the interventions),
we can either store them and update at the end, or update our beliefs sequentially, taking the
posterior P (M |Dt−1,w;Ct−1) at timestep t − 1 as the new “prior” for datum dt. If we are
also unsure about the parameters of the true model (i.e. wB and wS) we have to treat them
as random variables too and average over our uncertainty about them to compute a marginal
posterior over models M (see Appendix A).
Choosing interventions
It is clear that different interventions yield different outcomes, which in turn have different
probabilities under different models. This means that which interventions are valuable for
identifying the true model depends strongly on the hypothesis space and prior. For instance
fixing y to 1 (Do[y= 1]) is (probabilistically) diagnostic if you are primarily unsure whether x
causes z because p(z|Do[y=1]) differs depending whether pa(z) includes x. However, it is not
diagnostic if you are primarily unsure whether x causes y because y will take the value 1 the
same regardless of whether pa(x) includes y.
The value of an intervention can be quantified relative to a notion of uncertainty. We can
define the value of an intervention as the expected reduction in uncertainty about the true
model after seeing its outcome.5 To calculate this expectation, we must average, prospectively,
5Strictly this is greedy rather than optimal because planning several steps ahead can result in a different intervention
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over the different possible outcomes d′ ∈ Dc (recalling Dc is the space of possible outcomes of
intervention c) weighted by their marginal likelihoods under the prior. For a greedily optimal
sequence of interventions c1, . . . , ct, we take P (M |Dt−1,w;Ct−1) as our prior each time. The
most valuable intervention ct at a given time point is then
arg max
c∈C
E
d′∈Dc
[
∆H(M |d′, Dt−1,w;Ct−1, c)] , (4)
where E[.]d′∈Dc denotes the average over outcomes d′ and ∆H(.) denotes reduction in uncer-
tainty. We use Shannon entropy (1951) to measure uncertainty (see Appendix A). Shannon is
just one of a broad family of possible entropy measures (Nielsen & Nock, 2011). However, it is
one that has proved at least as long-run successful as a number of variants when applied as a
greedy strategy for choosing interventions (Bramley, Nelson, Speekenbrink, Crupi, & Lagnado,
2014) or asking binary questions (Nelson, 2005).
Behavioral patterns and existing explanations
Unfortunately, both inference and choosing interventions scale so poorly in the number
of variables, they are fundamentally intractable for any plausibly bounded learner (Cooper,
1990; van Rooij, Wright, Kwisthout, & Wareham, 2014). The number of possible graphs grows
rapidly with the number of variables they relate (3-, 4- and 5-variable problems have 25, 543
and 29281 respectively). Active intervention selection adds extra complexity because there are
many possible interventions (3-,4- and 5- variable problems permit 27, 81 and 243 patterns of
fixed “on”, fixed “off” and free components), each of which might yield many outcomes (up to
8, 16 and 32 respectively, depending how many variables are left free to vary). All combinations
of potential model, intervention and outcome should be averaged over in order to select the
most valuable intervention. This implies that people must find a considerably more economical
way to approximate model inference while maintaining satisfactory accuracy.
It is therefore not surprising that behavioral learning patterns in existing studies exhibit
marked divergence from the predictions of idealized Bayesian learning. Participants’ model
judgments are typically robustly better than chance, yet poor when compared directly against
an idealized Bayesian learner (Bramley, Gerstenberg, & Lagnado, 2014; Fernbach & Sloman,
2009; Lagnado & Sloman, 2002, 2004). Likewise, adults and even children have been shown
to select interventions that are robustly more informative than chance, but much less efficient
than idealized active learning (Bramley, Lagnado, & Speekenbrink, 2015; Coenen et al., 2015;
Gureckis & Markant, 2009; Lucas, Bridgers, Griffiths, & Gopnik, 2014; Markant & Gureckis,
2012; McCormack, Bramley, Frosch, Patrick, & Lagnado, 2016; Steyvers et al., 2003).
More revealing than mere performance are the ways in which participants’ judgments di-
verge from these rational norms (Anderson, 1990). Bramley, Lagnado, and Speekenbrink (2015)
found that participants’ judgments in a sequential active causal learning task resembled prob-
ability matching when lumped together, but that individuals’ trajectories were not well cap-
tured by simply adding decision noise to the Bayesian predictions. Individuals’ sequences
being favored. However, planning ahead was shown to make little difference for the similar problems explored in
Bramley et al (2015).
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of judgments were much too sequentially dependent, or “sticky”, compared to the Bayesian
predictions, tending to remain the same or similar over multiple elicitations as the objectively
most likely structure shifted. At the same time, when participants did change their judgments,
they tended to do so in ways that were consistent with the most recently gathered evidence,
neglecting evidence gathered earlier in learning. The result was a dual pattern of recency in
terms of judgments’ consistency with the evidence, and stickiness in terms of consistency with
the previous judgments. Bramley et al found that they could capture these patterns with the
addition of two parameters to the Bayesian model. The first was a forgetting parameter, en-
coding trial-by-trial leakage of information from the posterior as it became the prior for the
next test. The second was a conservatism parameter, encoding a non-normatively high proba-
bility assigned to the latest causal hypothesis. While the resulting model captured participants
choices, it still made the implausible assumption that learners maintained weighted proba-
bilistic beliefs across the whole hypothesis space and performed efficient active learning with
respect to these.
As with Bramley et al, Bonawitz et al. (2014) found that children and adults’ online struc-
ture judgments exhibited sequential dependence. To account for this they proposed an account
of how causal learners might rationally reduce the computational effort of continually recon-
sidering their model. In their “win-stay, lose-sample” scheme they suggest that learners main-
tain a single structural hypothesis, only resampling a new hypothesis from the posterior when
they see something surprising under their current model, concretely, with a probability that
increases as the most recent observation becomes less probable. This scheme guarantees that
the learner’s latest hypothesis is a sample from the posterior distribution at every point, but
does not the require them to resample with every new trial. While it captures the intuitive idea
that people will tend to stick with a hypothesis until it fails to perform, “win-stay, lose-sample”
still requires the learner to store all the past evidence to use when resampling, and does not
provide a recipe for how the samples are drawn.6
Another approach to understanding deviations between people’s causal judgments and
rational norms comes from the idea that people construct causal models in a modular or piece-
wise way. For example, Waldmann, Cheng, Hagmayer, and Blaisdell (2008) propose a mini-
mal rational model under which learners infer the relationships between each pair of variables
separately without worrying about the dependencies between them, ending up with a mod-
ular causal model that allows for good local inferences but which leads to so-called “Markov
violations” in more complex inferences where participants fail to respect the conditional de-
pendencies and independences implied by the global model (Rehder, 2014). They show that
this minimal model is sufficient to capture participants judgment patterns in two case stud-
ies. Building on this idea of locality, Fernbach and Sloman (2009) asked participants to make
judgments following observation of several preselected interventions. They found that partic-
ipants were particularly bad at inferring chains, often inferring spurious additional links from
the root to the sink node (e.g. x → z as well as x → y and y → z), a pattern also observed
in Bramley, Lagnado, and Speekenbrink (2015). Fernbach and Sloman proposed that this was
6The authors mention that MCMC could be used to draw these samples without representing the full posterior.
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a consequence of participants inferring causal relationships through local rather than global
computations. In the example, the interventions on x would normally lead to activations of z
due to the indirect connection via y. If learners attended only to x and z there would be the
appearance of a direct relationship. They found that they could better model participants by
assuming they inferred each causal link separately while ignoring the the rest of the model.
Embodying this principle, (Bramley, Lagnado, & Speekenbrink, 2015) proposed a simple en-
dorsement heuristic for online causal learning that would tend to add direct edges to a model
between intervened-on variables and any variables that activated as a result, removing edges
going to any variables that didn’t activate. By doing this after each new piece of evidence, the
model exhibited recency as the older edges would tend to be overwritten by newly inferred
ones, as well as as capturing the pattern of adding unnecessary direct connections in causal
chains. The model did a good job of predicting participants’ patterns but was outperformed by
the Bayesian model bounded with forgetting and conservatism. Additionally, like any heuris-
tic, simple endorsement’s success is conditional on its match to the situation. For instance, simple
endorsement does badly in cases where there are many chains – meaning that the outcome of
many interventions are indirect, and also if the true wB is high.
Going beyond causal learning, sequential effects are ubiquitous in cognition. In some in-
stances they can be rational; for instance moderate recency is rational in a changing world
(Julier & Uhlmann, 1997). Regardless, there are a plethora of non Bayesian models that can
reproduce various sequential effects (DeCarlo, 1992; Gilden, 2001; Treisman & Williams, 1984).
A common class of these is based on the idea of adjusting an estimate part way toward new
evidence (e.g. Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986; Petrov & Anderson, 2005; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972).
Updating point estimates means that a learner need not keep all the evidence in memory but
can instead make use of the location of the point(s) as a proxy for what was learned in the past.
Bramley, Dayan, and Lagnado (2015) propose a model inspired by these ideas, that maintains
a single hypothesis, but simultaneously attempts to minimize edits along with the number of
variables’ latest states that the current model fails to explain. The result is a model where the
current belief acts as an anchor and the learner tends to try to explain the latest evidence by
making the minimal number of changes to it. Again, this model provided a good fit with par-
ticipants’ judgments, but did not provide a procedure for how participants were able to search
the hypothesis space for the causal structure that minimized these constraints.
In summary, a number of ideas and models have been proposed in the causal and active
learning literatures. By design, they all do a good job of capturing patterns in human causal
judgments. However, it is not clear that any of these proposals provide a general purpose,
scalable explanation for human success in learning a complex causal world-model. Some (e.g
win-stay, lose-sample) capture behavioral patterns within the normative framework, but do not
provide a scalable algorithm. Others (e.g. simple endorsement) provide simple scalable heuristics
but may not generalize beyond the tasks they were designed for, nor explain human successes
in harder problems. In the next section we take inspiration from methods for approximate in-
ference in machine learning to construct a general purpose algorithm for incremental structure
change that satisfies both these desiderata.
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Algorithms for causal learning with limited resources
We now turn to algorithms in machine learning that make approximate learning efficient
in otherwise intractable circumstances. Additionally, research in these fields on active learning
and optimal experiment design has identified a range of reasonable heuristics for selecting
queries when the full expected information calculation of (Equation 4) is intractable. We will
take inspiration from some of these ideas to give a formal basis to the intuitions behind the
Neurath’s ship metaphor. We will then use this formal model to generate predictions that we
will compare to participants’ behavior in several experiments.
Approximating with a few hypotheses
One common approximation, for situations where a posterior cannot be evaluated in closed
form, is to maintain a manageable number of individual hypotheses, or “particles” (Liu &
Chen, 1998), with weights corresponding to their relative likelihoods. The ensemble of parti-
cles then acts as an approximation to the desired distribution. Sophisticated reweighting and
resampling schemes can then filter the ensemble as data are observed, approximating Bayesian
inference.
These “particle filtering” methods have been used to explain how humans and other an-
imals might approximate the solutions to complex problems of probabilistic inference. In
associative learning (Courville & Daw, 2007), categorization (Sanborn, Griffiths, & Navarro,
2010) and binary decision making (Vul, Goodman, Griffiths, & Tenenbaum, 2009), it has been
proposed that people’s beliefs actually behave most like a single particle, capturing why indi-
viduals often exhibit fluctuating and sub-optimal judgment while maintaining a connection to
Bayesian inference, particularly at the population level.
Sequential local search
The idea that people’s causal theories are like particles requires they also have some proce-
dure for sampling or adapting these theories as evidence is observed. Another class of useful
machine learning methods involves generating sequences of hypotheses, each linked to the
next via a form of possibly stochastic transition mechanism. Two members of this class are
particularly popular in the present context: Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling,
which asymptotically approximates the posterior distribution; and (stochastic) hill climbing,
which merely tries to find hypotheses that have high posterior probabilities.
MCMC algorithms involve stochastic transitions with samples that are typically easy to
generate. Under various conditions, this implies that the sequences of (dependent) sample
hypotheses form a Markov chain with a stationary distribution that is the full, intended, poste-
rior distribution (Metropolis, Rosenbluth, Rosenbluth, Teller, & Teller, 1953). The samples will
appear to “walk” randomly around space of possibilities, tending to visit more probable hy-
potheses more frequently. If samples are extracted from the sequence after a sufficiently long
initial, so-called burn-in, period, and sufficiently far apart (to reduce the effect of dependence),
they can provide a good approximation to the true posterior distribution. There are typically
many different classes of Markov chain transitions that share the same stationary distribution,
11
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but differ in the properties of burn-in and subsampling.
The stochasticity inherent in MCMC algorithms implies that the sequence sometimes makes
a transition from a more probable to a less probable hypothesis – this is necessary to sample
multi-modal posterior distributions. A more radical heuristic is only to allow transitions to
more probable hypotheses — this is called “hill-climbing”, attempting to find, and then stick
at, the best hypothesis (Tsamardinos, Brown, & Aliferis, 2006). This is typically faster than a full
MCMC algorithm to find a good hypothesis, but is prone to become stuck in a local optimum,
where the current hypothesis is more likely than all its neighbors, but less likely than some
other more distant hypothesis.
Applied to causal structure inference, we might in either case consider transitions that
change at most a single edge in the model (Cooper & Herskovits, 1992; Goudie & Mukherjee,
2011). A simple case is Gibbs sampling (Geman & Geman, 1984), starting with some structural
hypothesis and repeatedly selecting an edge (randomly or systematically) and re-sampling it
(either adding, removing or reversing) conditional on state of the other edges. This means that
a learner can search for a new hypothesis by making local changes to their current hypothesis,
reconsidering each of the edges in turn, conditioning on the state of the others without ever
enumerating all the possibilities. By constructing a short chain of such “rethinks” a learner can
easily update a singular hypothesis without starting from scratch. The longer the chain, the
less dependent or “local” the new hypothesis will be to the starting point.
The idea that stochastic local search plays an important role in cognition has some precedent
(Gershman, Vul, & Tenenbaum, 2012; Sanborn et al., 2010). For instance, Abbott, Austerweil,
and Griffiths (2012) propose a random local search model of memory retrieval and Ullman,
Goodman, and Tenenbaum (2012) propose an MCMC search model for capturing how chil-
dren search large combinatorial theory spaces when learning intuitive physical theories like
taxonomy and magnetism. The idea that people might update their judgments by something
like MCMC sampling is also explored by Lieder, Griffiths and Goodman (2012; under review).
They argue that under reasonable assumptions about the costs of resampling and need for ac-
curacy, it can be rational to update one’s beliefs by constructing short chains where the the
updated judgment retains some dependence on its starting state, arguing that this might ex-
plain anchoring effects (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982).
In addition to computational savings, updating beliefs by local search can be desirable for
statistical reasons. If the learner has forgotten some of the evidence they have seen, the location
of their previous hypothesis acts like a very approximate version of a sufficient statistic for the
forgotten information. This can make it advantageous to the learner to strike a good balance
between editing their model to account better for the data they can remember, and staying
close to their previous model to retain the connection to the data they have forgotten (Bramley,
Lagnado, & Speekenbrink, 2015).
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Neurath’s ship: An algorithmic-level model of sequential belief
change
The previous section summarized two ideas derived from computer science and statistics
that provide a potential solution to the computational challenges of causal learning: maintain-
ing only a single hypothesis at a time, and exploring new hypotheses using local search based
on sampling. In this section, we formalize these ideas to define a class of models of causal
learning inspired by the metaphor of Neurath’s ship. We start by treating interventions as
given, and only focus on inference. We then consider the nature of the interventions.
Concretely, we propose that causal learners maintaining only a single causal model (a single
particle), bt−1 and a collection of recent evidence and interventionsDt−1r and Ct−1r at time t− 1.
They then make inferences by:
1. Observing the latest evidence dt and ct and adding it to the collection to makeDtr and Ctr.
2. Then, searching for local improvements to bt−1 by sequentially reconsidering edgesEij ∈
{1 : i → j, 0 : i = j, − 1 : i ← j} (adding, subtracting or reorienting them) conditional
on the current state of the edges in the rest of their model E\ij – e.g. with probability
P (Eij |E\ij ,Dtr, Ctr,w).
3. After searching for k steps, stopping and taking the latest version of their model as their
new belief bt. If bt differs from bt−1 the evidence is forgotten (Dtr and Ctr become {}), and
they begin collecting evidence again.
A detailed specification of this process is given in Appendix A.
Starting with any hypothesis and repeatedly resampling edges conditional on the others is
a form of Gibbs sampling (Goudie & Mukherjee, 2011). Further, the learner can make use of
the data they have forgotten by starting the search with their current belief bt−1, since these
data are represented to some degree in the location of bt−1. Resampling using the recent data
P (M |Dtr, Ctr,w) allows the learner to adjust their beliefs to encapsulate better the data they
have just seen, and let this evidence fall out of memory once it has been incorporated into the
model.
Resampling, hill climbing or random change
Following the procedure outlined above, the learner’s search steps would constitute de-
pendent samples from the posterior over structures givenDtr. However, it is also plausible that
learners will try to hill-climb rather than sample, preferring to move to more probable local
models more strongly than would be predicted by Gibbs sampling. In order to explore this, we
will consider generalizations of of the update equation allowing transitions to be governed by
powers of the conditional edge probability (i.e. Pω(Eij = e|E\ij ,Dtr, Ctr,w)), yielding stronger
or weaker preference for the most likely state of Eij depending whether ω > 1 or < 1. By
setting ω to zero, we would get a model that does not learn but just moves randomly between
hypotheses, tending to remain local and by setting it to infinity we would get a model that
always moved to the most likely state for the edge.
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Search length
It is reasonable to assume that the number of search steps k that a learner performs will be
variable, but that their capacity to search will be relatively stable. Therefore, we assume that
for each update, the learner searches for k steps, where k is drawn from a Poisson distribution
with mean λ ∈ [0,∞].
The value of λ thus determines how sequentially dependent a learner’s sequences of beliefs
are. A large λ codifies a tendency to move beliefs a long way to account for the latest dataDtr at
the expense of the older data – retained only in the location of the previous belief bt−1 – while
a moderate λ captures a reasonable trade-off between starting state and new evidence, and a
small λ captures conservatism, i.e. failure to shift beliefs enough to account for the latest data.7
Putting these together
By representing the transition probabilities from model i to model j, for a particular setting
of hill climbing parameter ω and data Dtr, with a transition matrix Rωt , we can thus make
probabilistic predictions about a learner’s new belief bt ∈ Bt.8 The probabilities depend on
the previous belief bt−1 and their average search length λ. By averaging over different search
lengths with their probability controlled by λ, and taking the requisite row of the resulting
transition matrix we get the following equation
P (bt = m|Dtr, Ctr, bt−1, ω, λ) =
∞∑
0
λke−λ
k!
[(Rωt )
k]bt−1m (5)
Note that this equation describes the probability of a Neurath’s ship style search terminating in
a given new location. The learner themselves need only follow the four steps described above,
sampling particular edges and search length rather than averaging over the possible values of
these quantities. See Appendix A for more details and Figure 2 for an example.
Selecting interventions on Neurath’s ship: A local uncertainty
schema
In situations where a posterior is already hard to evaluate, calculating the globally most
informative intervention – finding the intervention ct that maximizes Equation 4 – will almost
always be infeasible. Therefore, a variety of heuristics have been developed that allow tests
to be selected that are more useful than random selection, but do not require the full expected
information gain be computed (Settles, 2012). These tend to rely on the learners’ current, rather
than expected, uncertainty (e.g. uncertainty sampling which chooses based on outcome uncer-
tainty under the prior) or the predictions under just a few favored hypotheses (e.g. query by
committee) as a substitute for the full expectancy calculation. The former relies on maintaining
7Note that we later cap k at 50 when estimating our model having established that search lengths beyond these
bounds made negligible difference to predictions.
8We define this matrix formally in Appendix A. Note that we assume transitions that would create a loop in the
overall model get a probability of zero. This assumption could be dropped for learning dynamic Bayesian networks
but is necessary for working with directed acyclic graphs.
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Figure 2: An illustration of NS model of causal belief updating. a) An example search path: The learner starts out
with a singly connected model at the top (x → y connection only). They update their beliefs by resampling one edge
at a time e ∈ {→,=,←}. Each entry i, j in the matrices gives the probability of moving from model in the row i to
the model in the column j when resampling the edge marked with the colored question mark. Lighter shades of the
requisite color indicate low transition probability, darker shades indicate greater transition probability; yellow is used
to indicate zero probabilities. Here the learner stops after resampling each edge once, moving from bt−1 of [x → y]
to bt of [x → y, x → z, y → z]. b) Assuming the edge to resample is chosen at random, we can average over the
different possible edge choices to derive a 1-step Markov chain transition matrix Rωt encompassing all the possibilities.
By raising this matrix to higher powers we get the probability of different end points for searches of that length. If
the chain is short (small k) the final state depends heavily on the starting state (left) but for longer chains (large k), the
starting state becomes less important, getting increasingly close to independent sampling from the desired distribution
(right).
a complete prior distribution, making the latter a more natural partner to the Neurath’s ship
framework.
We have proposed a model of structure inference under which learners are only able to
consider a small set of of alternatives at a time, and only able to generate alternatives that are
“local” in some dimension. Locally driven intervention selection is a natural partner to this
for at least two reasons: (1) Under the constraints of the Neurath’s ship framework, learners
would not be able to work with the prospective distributions required to estimate global ex-
pected informativeness, but could potentially estimate expected informativeness with respect
to a sufficiently narrow sets of alternatives. (2) Evidence optimized to distinguishing local
15
Running head: NEURATH’S SHIP
possibilities (focused on one edge at a time for instance) might better support sequential local
belief updates (of the kind emphasized in our framework) than the globally most informative
evidence (Patil, Zhu, Kopec´, & Love, 2014). In line with this, we propose one way in which
learners might select robustly informative interventions by attempting only to distinguish a
few “local” possibilities at a time, requiring only “local” uncertainty estimates to target the
possibilities on which to focus (Markant, Settles, & Gureckis, 2015).
The idea that learners will focus on distinguishing only a few alternatives at a time requires
specifying how they choose which of the many possible subsets of the full hypothesis space
to target with a particular test. Queries that optimally reduce expected uncertainty about one
local aspect of a problem are liable to differ from those that promise high global uncertainty
reduction. For example, Figure 3b shows two trials taken from our experiments, and shows
that the expected values of each of a range of different intervention choices (shown in Figure 3a)
are very different depending whether the learner is focused on resolving global uncertainty all
at once, or on resolving some specific “local” aspect of it. This illustrates the idea that a learner
might choose a test that is optimally informative with respect to a modest range of options
that they have in mind at the time (e.g. models that differ just in terms of the state of Exz) yet
appear sporadically inefficient from the perspective of greedy global uncertainty reduction.
Furthermore, by licensing quite different intervention preferences, they allow us to diagnose
individual and trial-by-trial differences in focus preference.
In the current work, we will consider three possible varieties of focus, one motivated by
the Neurath’s ship framework (edge focus) and two inspired by existing ideas about bounded
search and discovery in the literature (effects focus and confirmation focus). While these are by
no means exhaustive they represent a reasonable starting point.
The two stages of the schema
The idea that learners focus on resolving local rather than global uncertainty results in a
metaproblem of choosing what to focus on next, making intervention choice a two stage pro-
cess. We write L for the set of all possible foci l, and L ⊂ L for the subset of possibilities that
the learner will consider at a time, such as the the state of a particular edge or the effects of a
particular variable. The procedure is:
Stage 1 Selecting a local focus lt ∈ L
Stage 2 Selecting an informative test ct with respect to the chosen focus lt
Different learners might differ in the types of questions they consider, meaning thatLmight
contain different varieties and combinations of local focuses. We first formalize the two stages
of the schema, and then propose three varieties of local focus that learners might consider in
their option set L that differ in terms of which and how many alternatives they include.
As mentioned above, we assume that the learner has some way of estimating their current
local confidence. We will assume confidence here is approximately the inverse of uncertainty,
so assume for simplicity that learners can calculate uncertainty from the evidence they have
gathered since last changing their model in the form of the entropy H(l|Dtr,w; Ctr) for all l ∈ L
(the assumption we examine in the discussion). They then choose (Stage 1) the locale where
16
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these data imply the least certainty
lt = arg max
l∈L
H(l|bt−1,Dtr,w; Ctr) (6)
However, in carrying out Stage 2 we make the radical assumption that learners do not use
P (lt|Dtr, bt−1,w; Ctr), but rather, consistent with the method of inference itself, only consider
the potential next datum d′. This means that the intervention ct itself is chosen to maximize
the expected information about lt, ignoring pre-existing evidence, and using what amounts to
a uniform prior. Specifically, we assume that ct is chosen as
ct = arg max
c∈C
E
d∈Dc
[
∆H(lt|d,w, bt−1; c)] (7)
where we detail the term in the expectation below for the three types of focuses.
Assuming real learners will exhibit some decision noise, we can model both choice of focus
and choice of intervention relative to a focus as soft (Luce, 1959) rather than strict maximization
giving focus probabilities
P (lt|Dtr, bt−1,w; Ctr) =
exp(H(lt|Dtr, bt−1,w; Ctr)ρ)∑
l∈L exp(H(l|Dtr, bt−1,w; Ctr)ρ)
(8)
governed by some inverse temperature parameter ρ, and choice probabilities
P (ct|l,w, bt−1) = exp(Ed′∈Dc
[
∆H(l|d′,w, bt−1; ct)] η)∑
c∈C exp(Ed′∈Dc [∆H(l|d′,w, bt−1; c)] η)
(9)
governed by inverse temperature η.
Three varieties of local focus
Edges
An obvious choice, given the Neurath’s ship framework, would be for learners to try to
distinguish alternatives that differ in terms of a single edge (Figure 3a), i.e. those they would
consider during a single update step.
For a chosen edge Exy we can then consider a learner’s goal to be to maximise their expec-
tation of
∆H(Exy|Et−1\xy ,d,w; c) (10)
(see Appendix A for the full local entropy equations). Note that Equation 10 is a refinement
of Equation 7 for the case of focusing on an edge, from bt−1 the learner need only condition
on the other edges Et−1\xy . This goal results in a preference for fixing one of the nodes of the
target edge “on”, leaving the other free, and depending on the other connections in bt−1, either
favors fixing the other variables “off” or is indifferent about whether they are “on”, “off” or
“free” (Figure 3b). For an edge focused local learner, the set of possible focuses includes all the
edges L ∈ ∀i<j∈NEij .
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Effects
A commonly proposed heuristic for efficient search in the deterministic domains is to ask
about the dimension that best divides the hypothesis space, eliminating the greatest possible
number of options on average. This is variously known as “constraint-seeking” (Ruggeri &
Lombrozo, 2014) or “the split half heuristic” (Nelson, Divjak, Gudmundsdottir, Martignon, &
Meder, 2014). In the case of identifying the true deterministic (wS = 1 and wB = 0) causal
model on N variables through interventions it turns out that the best split is achieved by
querying the effects of a randomly chosen variable, essentially asking: “What does x do?”
(Figure 3a)9. Formally we might think of this question as asking: which other variables (if any)
are descendants of variable x in the true model? This a broader focus than querying the state
of a single edge, but considerably simpler question than the global “which is the right causal
model?” because the possibilities just include the different combinations of the other variables
as effects (e.g. neither, either or both of y and z are descendants of x in a 3-variable model) rather
than the superexponential number of model possibilities10.
Relative to a chosen variable x, we can write an effect focus goal as maximizing the expecta-
tion of
∆H(De(x)|d,w; c) (11)
where De(x) is is the set of x’s direct or indirect descendants. This focus does not depend on
bt−1. This goal results in a preference for fixing the target node “on” (e.g. Do[x= 1]) and leaving
the rest of the variables free to vary (Figure 3b). For an effect focused local learner, the set of
possible focuses includes all the nodes L ∈ ∀i∈XDe(X{i}).
Confirmation
Another form of local test, is to seek evidence that would confirm or refute the current
hypothesis, against a single alternative “null” hypothesis. Confirmatory evidence gathering
is a ubiquitous psychological phenomenon (Klayman & Ha, 1989; Nickerson, 1998). Although
confirmation seeking is widely touted as a bias, it can also be shown to be optimal, for example
under deterministic or sparse hypotheses spaces or peaked priors (Austerweil & Griffiths, 2011;
Navarro & Perfors, 2011).
Accordingly, Coenen et al. (2015) propose that causal learners adopt a “positive test strat-
egy” when distinguishing causal models. They define this as a preference to “turn on” a parent
component of one’s hypothesis – observing whether the activity propagates to the other vari-
ables in the way that this hypothesis predicts. They find that people often intervene on sus-
pected parent components, even when this is uninformative, and do so more often under time
pressure. In Coenen et al’s tasks, the goal was always to distinguish between two hypotheses,
so their model assumed people would sum over the number of descendants each variable had
under each hypotheses and turn on the component that had the most descendants on average.
However, this does not generalize to the current, unrestricted, context where all variables have
9This is also the most globally informative type of test relative to a uniform prior in all of the noise conditions we
consider in the current paper
10The number of directed acyclic graphs on N nodes, |M|N , can be computed with the recurrence relation |M|N =∑
k∈N (−1)k−1
(
N
2
)
2k(N−k)|M|N−1 (see Robinson, 1977)
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the same number of descendants if you average over the whole hypothesis space. However,
Steyvers et al (2003) propose a related rational test model that selects interventions with a goal
of distinguishing a single current hypothesis from a null hypothesis that there is no causal
connection.
Following Steyvers et al. (2003), for a confirmatory focus we consider interventions expected
to best reduce uncertainty between the learner’s current hypothesis bt−1 and a null b0 in which
there are no connections (Figure 3a).
∆H({bt, b0}|bt−1,d,w; c) (12)
This goal results in a preference for fixing on the root node(s) of the target hypothesis (Figure 3c
ii, noting the confirmation focus favours Do[x= 1, y= 1] here). The effectiveness of confirma-
tory focused testing depends on the level of noise and the prior, becoming increasingly useful
later once the model being tested has sufficiently high prior probability. For a confirmation
focused learner there is always just a single local focus.
Implications of the schema
The local uncertainty schema implies that intervention choice depends on two separable
stages. Thus it accommodates the idea that a learner might be poor at choosing what to focus
on but good at selecting an informative intervention relative to their chosen focus. It also allows
that we might understand differences in learners’ intervention choices as consequences of the
types of local focus they are inclined or able to focus on. Learners cognizant of the limitations in
their ability to incorporate new evidence might choose to focus their intervention on narrower
questions (i.e. learning about a single edge at a time) while others might focus too broadly and
fail to learn effectively. In the current work we will fit behavior assuming that learners choose
between these local focuses, using their patterns to diagnose which local focuses they include
in their option set L, which of these they choose on a given test lt and finally how these choices
relate to their final performance.
Comparing model predictions to experiments
The Neurath’s ship framework we have introduced has two distinct signatures. Making only
local edits from a single hypothesis results in sequential dependence. Making these edits by
local resampling leads to aggregate behavior that can range between probability matching and
hill climbing–which can give better short term gains but with a tendency to get stuck in local
optima. Two of the other heuristics also lead to sequential dependence. Win-stay lose-sample
predicts all-or-none dependence whereby learners’ judgments will either stay the same or jump
to a new location that depends only on the posterior. Simple endorsement also predicts recency,
although is distinguished by its failure to separate direct from indirect effects of interventions,
leading to a different pattern of structural change.
In terms of interventions, if participants are locally focused, we expect their hypotheses to
deviate from optimal predictions in ways that can be accommodated by our local uncertainty
schema, i.e. selecting interventions that are more likely to be targeted toward local rather than
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Figure 3: An illustrative example of local focused uncertainty minimization a) Three possible “local” focuses. b) The
value of these choices of focus according to their current uncertainty Equation 6 (i.) at the start of learning and (ii.)
after several tests have been performed. Note that uncertainty is measured with Shannon entropy based on the local
possibilities and Dtr and that confirmation is undefined at the start of learning where both current and null hypothesis
are that there are no connections in the model. c) Expected value of 19 different interventions assuming: global ex-
pected information gain from the true prior (green squares, and shaded), effects of z focus (red circles), the relationship
between x and y (blue triangles) and confirming bt−1 (yellow diamonds), assuming a uniform prior over the requisite
possibilities and a known wS and wB of .85 and .15.
global uncertainty. If learners do not maintain the full posterior, we expect their intervention
distributions to be relatively insensitive to the evidence that has already been seen, while still
being locally informative. If people disproportionately focus on identifying effects, we expect
to see relatively unconstrained interventions with one variable fixed “on” at a time. If peo-
ple focus on individual edges we expect more constraining interventions with more variables
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fixed “off”. If confirmatory tests are employed, we expect to see more interventions on putative
parents than on child nodes.
We first compare the predictions of our framework to existing data from Bramley, Lagnado,
and Speekenbrink (2015). We then report on three new experiments designed to further test
the specific predictions of our framework.
Bramley, Lagnado, and Speekenbrink (2015)
In Bramley, Lagnado, and Speekenbrink (2015), participants interacted with five probabilis-
tic causal systems involving 3 variables (see Figure 4a), repeatedly selecting interventions (or
tests) to perform in which any number of the variables are either fixed “on” or “off”, while
the remainder are left free to vary. The tests people chose, along with the parameters w of the
true underlying causal model, jointly determined the data they saw. In this experiment wS was
always .8 and wB was always .1. After each test, participants registered their best guess about
the underlying structure. They were incentivised to report their best guess about the structure,
through receipt of a bonus for each causal relation (or non-relation) correctly registered at the
end. There were three conditions: no information (N=79) was run first. After discovering that a
significant minority of participants performed at chance, condition information (N=30), added a
button that participants could hover over and remind themselves of the key instructions during
the task (the noise, strengths, the goal) and condition information + summary (N=30) addition-
ally provided a visual summary of all previous tests and their outcomes.11 Participants could
draw cyclic causal models if they wanted (e.g. x → y → z → x) and were not forced to select
something for every edge from the start but instead could leave some or all of the edges as “?”.
Once a relationship was selected they could not return to “?”. The task is available online at
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/lagnado-lab/el/ns sup.
Comparing judgment patterns
We compared participants’ performance in Bramley, Lagnado, and Speekenbrink (2015) to
that of several simulated learners. Posterior draws a new sample from the posterior for each
judgment. Random simply draws a random graph on each judgment. Neurath’s ship follows
the procedure detailed in the previous section, beginning with its previous judgment (bt−1,
or an unconnected model at t=1) and reconsidering one edge at a time based on the evidence
gathered since its last change Dtr for a small number of steps after observing each outcome.
We illustrate this with a simulation with a short mean search length λ of 1.5 and behavior
ω of 10 corresponding moderate hill climbing. Win-stay, lose-sample sticks with the previous
judgment with probability 1−P (Dt|bt−1w;Ct) or alternatively samples from the full posterior.
The simple endorser always adds edges from any intervened-upon variables to any activated
variables on each trial, and removes them from any intervened-upon variables to any non-
activated variables, overwriting any edges going in the opposing direction. Participants’ final
accuracy in Bramley, Lagnado, and Speekenbrink (2015) was closest to the Neurath’s ship as
11In the paper this was reported as two experiments, the second with two between-subjects conditions. They share
identical structure they were subsequently analyzed together. Therefore we do the same here, reporting as a single
experiment with three between-subjects conditions.
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is clear in Figure 5a and b. That the Neurath’s ship simulation unperformed participants in
condition information + summary is to be expected since these participants were given a full
record of past tests while Neurath’s ship uses only the recent data.
Additionally, participants’ online judgments exhibited sequential dependence. This can be
seen in Figure 5b comparing the distribution of edits (bars) to the markedly larger shifts we
would expect to see assuming random or Bayesian posterior sampling on these trials (black
full and dotted lines). The overall pattern of edit distances from judgment to judgment is
commensurate with those produced by the Neurath’s ship procedure (red line), but also, here
by win-stay, lose-sample (blue line) and simple endorser (green line) simulations.
Comparing intervention patterns
To compare intervention choices to global and locally driven intervention selection, we sim-
ulated the task with the same number of simulations as participants, stochastically generating
the outcomes of the simulations’ intervention choices according to the true model and true w
(which the participants knew). Simulated efficient active learners would perfectly track the
posterior and always select the greediest intervention (as in Equation 4).
We also compared participants’ interventions to those of several other simulated learners,
each restricted to one of the three types of local focus introduced in Section 4 (‘edge’. ‘effects’ or
‘confirmation’).12 When one of the simulated learners did not generate a unique best interven-
tion, it would sample uniformly from the joint-best interventions according to that criterion.
The results of the simulations are visualized in Figure 5c and d.
Participants’ intervention choices in Bramley, Lagnado, and Speekenbrink (2015) were clearly
more informative than random selection but less so than ideal active learning. This is evident
in Figure 5c comparing participants (bars) to simulations of ideal active learning (black cir-
cles) and random intervening (black squares), and in Figure 5d comparing the participants
(red lines) to the ideal active learning (pink lines) and random intervening (blue lines) simu-
lations. Furthermore, the informativeness of participants’ interventions is in the range of the
simulations of any of the three local foci (yellow, green and blue lines).
As we see in Figure 5d, idealized active learning favored fixing one variable on at a time
(Do[x = 1], Do[y = 1] etc, hereafter called “one-on” interventions) for the majority of tests.
It always chose “one-on” for the first few tests but would sometimes select controlled (e.g.
Do[x=1, y=0]) tests on later tests when the remaining uncertainty was predominantly between
direct and indirect causal pathways as in between chain, fork and fully connected structures.
Locally driven testing had different signatures depending on the focus. The edge focused
simulation would fix the component at one end of their edge of interest “on” and leave the
component at the other end “free”. What it did with the third component depended on its
latest judgment about the network. If, according to bt−1, another component was a cause of
the component that was left free-to-vary, the simulation favored fixing it “off”. Otherwise,
it did not distinguish between “on”, “off” or “free” choosing one of these at random. The
12We assumed these tests were chosen based on a uniform prior over the options considered. We used the latest
most probable judgment argmaxp(M |Dt−1,w) in place of a current hypothesis bt−1 for edge focused and confirmatory
testing so as not to presuppose a particular belief update rule in assessing intervention selection.
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resulting pattern is a spread across “one-on”, “two-on” and “one-on, one-off” tests with a bias
toward controlled “one-on, one-off” tests. The effects focused learner always favored “one-on”
interventions. The confirmation focused tester would generally fix components with children in
bt−1 on, and leave components with parents in bt−1 free. This led to the choice of a mixture of
“one-on” and “two-on” interventions.
Like the ideal or the effects focused simulations, participants in Bramley, Lagnado, and
Speekenbrink (2015) strongly favored “one-on” tests. Consistent with confirmatory testing,
components with at least one child according to the latest hypothesis bt−1 were more likely
to be fixed “on” than components believed to have no children (60% compared to 56% of the
time t(24568) = 3.2, p = .001).13 Participants’ intervention selections were markedly less dy-
namic across trials than those of the efficient learner. For example, the proportion of single (e.g.
[x=1]) interventions decreased only fractionally on later tests, dropping from 78% to 73% from
the first to the last test.
Motivating the new experiments
In analyzing Bramley, Lagnado, and Speekenbrink (2015), we found patterns of judgments
and interventions broadly consistent with our framework. However, the conclusions we can
draw from this data alone are somewhat limited. Firstly, the problems participants faced
did not strongly delineate our Neurath’s ship proposal from other proposed approximations,
namely the approximate win-stay, lose-sample or the heuristic simple endorsement which also pre-
dicted similar patterns of accuracy and sequential dependence.
Similarly, in terms of interventions, participants’ strong preference for “one-on” interven-
tions was consistent with local effect-focused testing. However, “one-on” interventions were
also the globally most informative choices for the majority of participants’ trials, especially
early during learning. Thus, we cannot be confident what participants focused on when select-
ing their interventions.
Methodologically also, several aspects of Bramley, Lagnado, and Speekenbrink (2015) are
suboptimal for testing our framework. Participants were allowed to leave edges unspecified
until the the last test and could also draw cyclic models, both of which complicated our anal-
yses. Furthermore, participants had 12 tests on each problem, allowing an idealized learner to
approach certainty given the high wS and low wB , and for a significant minority of people to
perform at ceiling. These choices limit the incentive for participants to be efficient with their
interventions. Additionally, participants were only incentivised to be accurate with their final
judgment, meaning we cannot be confident that intermediate judgments always represented
their best and latest guess about the model. Finally, participants were not forced to update
all their edges after each test, meaning that lazy responding could be confused with genuine
sequential dependence of beliefs.
Next, we report on two new experiments that build on the paradigm from Bramley, Lagnado,
and Speekenbrink (2015), making methodological improvements, while also exploring harder
more revealing problems, and eliciting additional measures, all with the goal of better distin-
13We ran the same number of simulated learners as participants in each experiment and condition to facilitate statis-
tical comparison.
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Figure 4: The true models from Experiment 1: Learning larger models, and visualisation of averaged judgments and
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guishing our framework from competitors.
Experiment 1 explores learning in more complex problems than in Bramley, Lagnado, and
Speekenbrink (2015), with more variables and a range of strengthswS and levels of background
noise wB , and fewer interventions per problem. The increased complexity and noise provides
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on. All fixed = e.g. Do[x=0, y=1, z=0].
more space and stronger motivation for the use of approximations and heuristics. Furthermore,
the broader range of possible structures and intervention choices increases the discriminabil-
ity of our framework from alternatives such as win-stay, lose-sample and simple endorsement,
while the shorter problems avoid ceiling effects and ensure participants choose interventions
carefully. To ensure participants register their best and latest belief at every time point, we
also incentivize participants through their accuracy at random time points during learning. To
eliminate the possibility of lazy responding biasing results in favor of Neurath’s ship, we force
participants to mark all edges anew after every test without a record of their previous judgment
as a guide.
Experiment 2 inherits the methodological improvements, compares two elicitation proce-
dures, and also takes several additional steps. In the previous studies, participants were pre-
trained on strength wS and background noise wB . This will not generally be true; learners
will normally have to take into account their uncertainty about these sources of noise dur-
ing inference. Therefore, Experiment 2 focuses on cases where participants are not pretrained
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on w. Additionally, our framework makes predictions about participants’ problem represen-
tation that go beyond how it should manifest in final structure judgments and intervention
choices. Specifically, our local intervention schema proposes that people focus on subparts of
the overall problem during learning, switching between these by comparing their current local
uncertainty. Experiment 2 probes these assumptions by asking learners for confidence judg-
ments about the edges in the model during learning, and eliciting free explanations of what
interventions are supposed to be testing. When we go on to fit our framework to individuals
in the final section of the paper, we are able to code up these free responses in terms of the
hypotheses they refer to and compare them to the focuses predicted by our local uncertainty
schema.
Experiment 1: Learning larger causal models
Our first new experiment looks at learning in harder problems with a range of wS and wB
and a mixture of 3- and 4-variable problems, asking whether we now see a clearer signature
of Neurath’s ship, simple endorsement or win-stay,lose-sample style local updating or of local focus
during interventions selection.
Methods
Participants
120 participants (68 male, mean±SD age 33 ± 9) were recruited from Amazon Mechanical
Turk14, split randomly so that 30 performed in each of 4 conditions. They were paid $1.50 and
received a bonus of 10c per correctly identified connection on a randomly chosen test for each
problem (max = $6.00, mean±SD $3.7± 0.65). The task took an average of 44± 40 minutes.
Design
This study included the five 3-variable problems in Bramley, Lagnado, and Speekenbrink
(2015) plus five additional 4-variable problems (see Figure 4a). There were problems exem-
plifying three key types of causal structure: forks (diverging connections), chains (sequential
connections) and colliders (converging connections). Within these, the sparseness of the causal
connections varied between a single connection (devices 1 and 6) and fully connected (devices
5 and 10).
There were two different levels of causal strength wS ∈ [.9, 0.75] and two different levels of
background noise wB ∈ [.1, .25] making 2 × 2 = 4 between-subjects conditions. For instance,
in condition wS = .9;wB = .1 the causal systems were relatively reliable, with nodes rarely
activating without being intervened on, or caused by, an active parent, and connections rarely
failing to cause their effects. Meanwhile, in condition wS = 0.75;wB = 0.25 the outcomes were
substantially noisier, with probability .25 that a variable with no active parent would activate,
compared to a probability 1− (1− .75)(1− .25) = 0.81 for a variable with one active parent.
14Mechanical Turk (http://www.mturk.com/) is a web based platform for crowd-sourcing short tasks widely
used in psychology research. It offers an well validated (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Crump, McDonnell, &
Gureckis, 2013; Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, & John, 2004; Hauser & Schwarz, 2015; Mason & Suri, 2012) subject pool,
diverse in age and background, suitable for high-level cognition tasks.
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a)
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Figure 6: Experimental procedure. a) Selecting a test b) Observing the outcome c) Updating beliefs d) Getting feedback.
Procedure
The task interface was similar to that in Bramley, Lagnado, and Speekenbrink (2015). Each
device was represented as several gray circles on a white background (see Figure 6). Partic-
ipants were told that the circles were components of a causal system of binary variables, but
were not given any further cover story. Initially, all components were inactive and no connec-
tion was marked between them. Participants performed tests by clicking on the components,
setting them at one of three states “fixed on”, “fixed off” and “free-to-vary”, then clicking “test”
and observing what happened to the “free-to-vary”components as a result. The observations
were of temporary activity (graphically, activated components would turn green and wobble).
As in Bramley, Lagnado, and Speekenbrink (2015), participants registered their best guess
about the underlying structure after each test. They did this by clicking between the com-
ponents to select either no connection, or a forward or backward connection (represented as
black arrows). Participants were incentivised to be accurate, but unlike in Bramley, Lagnado,
and Speekenbrink (2015), payments were based on randomly selected time points rather than
the final judgments.
Participants completed instructions familiarizing them with the task interface; the interpre-
tation of arrows as (probabilistic) causal connections; the incentives for judgment accuracy. To
train w, participants were told explicitly and then shown unconnected components and forced
to test them several times. The frequency with which the components activated reflected the
true background noise level. They were then shown a set of two-component causal systems in
which component “x” was a cause of “y”, and were forced to test these systems several times
with component x fixed on. This indicated that the frequency with which y activated reflected
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the level of wS combined with the background noise they had already learned.
After completing the instructions, participants had to answer four comprehension check
questions. If they got any wrong they had to go back to the start of the instructions and try
again. Then, participants solved a practice problem randomly drawn from the problem set.
They then faced the test problems in random order, with randomly oriented unlabeled compo-
nents. They performed six tests on each three variable problem, and eight tests on each four
variable problem. After the final test for each problem they received feedback telling them the
true connections.
To ensure that participants’ judgments were always genuine directed acyclic graphs, par-
ticipants were told in the instructions that the true causal structure would not contain a loop.
Unlike in Bramley, Lagnado, and Speekenbrink (2015), if participants tried to draw a model
containing a cyclic structure they would see a message saying “you have drawn connections
that make a loop, change or remove one to continue”.
As in Bramley, Lagnado, and Speekenbrink (2015) conditions information and information +
summary, participants could hover their mouse over a button for a reminder of the key instruc-
tions during the task, but unlike condition information + summary, they saw no record of their
previous tests and outcomes.
The task can be tried out at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/lagnado-lab/el/ns sup.
Results and discussion
Judgments
In spite of the considerably greater noise and complexity than Bramley, Lagnado, and
Speekenbrink (2015), participants performed significantly above chance in all four conditions
(comparing to chance performance of 13 , participants scores differed significantly by t-test with
p < .001 for all four conditions). They also significantly underperformed a Bayes optimal ob-
server (p < .001 for all four conditions, Figure 7a). Performance declined as background noise
wB increased F (1, 118) = 4.3, η2 = .04, p = .04 but there was no evidence for a relationship
with strength wS F (1, 118) = 2.7, η2 = .04, p = 0.1. Judgment accuracy was no lower for four
compared to three variable problems t(238) = 0.76, p = 0.44. Table 1 shows accuracy by de-
vice type across all experiments. Accuracy differed by device type χ2 = (4) = 22, p < .001.
Consistent with the idea that people struggle most to distinguish the chain from the fork or
the fully connected model, accuracy was lowest for chains (devices 3; 8) and second lowest for
fully connected (5; 10) models.
In all four conditions, participants’ final accuracy was closer to that of the Neurath’s ship
simulations than the simple endorser, win-stay, lose sample or random responder or ideal (passive)
responding (Figure 7a).15
Sequential dependence
Table 2 summarizes the number of edits (additions, removals or reversals of edges) partici-
pants made between each judgment in all experiments. Inspecting the table and Figure 7b we
15On the rare occasions where the simple endorser procedure would induce a cycle (0.4% of trials), the edges were left
in their original state.
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Table 1: Proportion of Edges Correctly Identified by Device Type in All Experiments
Experiment Variables Single Fork Chain Collider Fully-
connected
No con-
nection
Bramley et al (2015) 3 0.69 0.63 0.66 0.71 0.67
Exp 1: Learning larger models 3 0.57 0.56 0.51 0.6 0.55
Exp 1: Learning larger models 4 0.56 0.58 0.48 0.57 0.49
Exp 2: Unknown strengths 3 0.62 0.65 0.61 0.6 0.61 0.61
All 0.61 0.61 0.57 0.62 0.58 0.61
Table 2: Edit Distance Between Consecutive Judgments in All Experiments.
Experiment Var ParticipantsRandom SE WSLS NS Posterior
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
Bramley et al (2015) 3 0.66 0.97 1.99 0.83 0.51 0.74 0.55 0.88 0.38 0.57 1.02 0.93
Exp 1: Learning larger models 3 0.92 1.01 1.99 0.83 0.44 0.64 0.73 0.98 0.50 0.63 1.47 0.94
Exp 1: Learning larger models 4 1.69 1.63 3.96 1.16 0.65 0.88 1.64 1.78 0.55 0.68 2.94 1.40
Exp 2: Unknown strengths (remain) 3 0.73 0.85 2.02 0.81 0.43 0.62 1.06 1.13 0.59 0.69 1.86 0.85
Exp 2: Unknown strengths (disappear) 3 1.02 0.99 2.02 0.81 0.43 0.62 1.06 1.13 0.59 0.69 1.86 0.85
All 0.99 1.09 2.40 0.89 0.50 0.71 0.99 1.17 0.51 0.65 1.80 1.00
NOTE: Var = number of variables. NS = Neurath’s ship simulations with λ = 1.5 and ω = 10, WSLS = Win-stay,
lose-sample simulations, SW = Simple Endorser simulations, M=mean, SD = standard deviation.
see participants judgments (both high and low performing) show a pattern of rapidly decreas-
ing probability for larger edit distances mimicked by both Neurath’s ship and simple endorsement
simulations. In contrast, random or posterior sampling lead to quite different signatures with
larger jumps being more probable. Choices simulated from Neurath’s ship and simple endorse-
ment were more sequentially dependent than participants’ on average but have the expected
decreasing shape. Win-stay, lose sample produces a different pattern with a maximum at zero
changes but a second peak in the same location as for posterior sampling but has an average edit
distance very close to that averaged over participants. However, we expect any random or
inattentive responding to inflate average edit distances, and indeed find a strong negative cor-
relation between edit distance and score F (1, 118) = 34, β = −6.7, η2 = .34, p < .001. A simple
way to illustrate this is to compare the edits of higher and lower performers. Scores of 2245 or
more differ significantly from chance performance (around 1545 ) by χ
2 test. The 79 participants
that scored 22 or more made markedly smaller edits than those that scored under 22 (0.85±0.95
compared to 1.3± 1.12 for three variable, and 1.4± 1.5 compared to 2.4± 1.8 for four variable
problems), putting the clearly successful participants patterns closer to the “Neurath’s ship”
and “simple endorser” simulations. Additionally, we expect individual differences in search
length λ under the Neurath’s ship model and here only simulate assuming a mean search length
of 1.5. Aggregating over a wider set of simulated learners with different capacities to search
for updates would lead to a heavier-tailed distribution of edit distances that would resemble
the participants’ choices more faithfully.
Interventions
Globally focused active learning favored a mixture of “one-on” and “one-on, one-off” in-
terventions (and several others including “one-on, two-off” in the four variable problems).
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The number and nature of the fixed variables it favored depended strongly on the condition,
favoring fixing more variables off when wS was high. It would also shift dramatically over
trials always favoring “one-on” interventions for the first trials but these dropping below 50%
of choices by the final test. Participants’ choices were much less reactive to condition or trial.
There were no clear differences in intervention choices by condition (see supplementary figures
available at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/lagnado-lab/el/ns sup) but participants were a
little more likely to select “one on” interventions on their first test 57% compared to their last
50% test t(238) = 1.7, p = .01. Like the ideal or the effects focused simulations, and like in Bram-
ley, Lagnado, and Speekenbrink (2015), learners favored “one-on” tests. However, in line with
an edge or confirmation they also selected a substantial number of “two-on” and “one-on, one-
off” interventions, doing so on early as well as late tests while the ideal learner only predicted
using “one-on, one-off” tests on the last few trials. As in Bramley, Lagnado, and Speekenbrink
(2015) and consistent with confirmatory testing, participants were more likely to fix “on” com-
ponents with at least one child according to their latest hypothesis bt−1: 49% compared to 30%
t(238) = 5.5, p < .001. The overall pattern was not clearly consistent with any one local focus
but might be consistent with a mixture of all three.
Experiment 2: Unknown strengths
In this experiment, we focused on cases where participants are not pretrained on w (see
Appendix A for the computational level details of how to incorporate uncertainty over w in
model inference and intervention choice).16
We took advantage of the fact that participants would experience substantially greater un-
certainty given ignorance about w to assess their ability to estimate local uncertainty based on
recently observed data Dtr in order to choose where to focus subsequent tests. This is central
to any scheme for intervention selection. Thus, in Experiment 3, we elicited the participants’
confidence about the edges in each judgment. If participants track local uncertainties based
on recent evidence, we should expect these to correlate with uncertainties given Dtr. In par-
ticular, given the representation associated with Neurath’s ship, we might also expect the local
confidences to be evaluated while leaning on the rest of the model for support. This means
they should reflect conditional uncertainty in the edge H(Eij |E\ij ,Dtr; Ctr) more closely than
the marginal uncertainty H(Eij |Dtr; Ctr) which involves averaging across all the possible states
of the other edges.
We also elicited predictions about the outcome of each chosen test before the outcome was
revealed. If participants maintained only a single hypothesis, we expected this to be reflected
in their predictions. Thus, for a Neurath’s ship learner, it would be predominantly the predictive
distribution under their current hypothesis rather than the average across models.
Finally, in Bramley, Lagnado, and Speekenbrink (2015) and Experiment 1, participants’ in-
tervention selections showed hints of being motivated by a mixture of local aspects of the over-
all uncertainty, with overall patterns most consistent with focus on a mixture of different local
16Experiments 2 is also reported briefly in Bramley, Dayan, and Lagnado (2015) but without discussion of the inter-
vention choices or current model.
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Figure 7: Experiment 1: Learning larger causal models; performance and interventions. a) Accuracy by condition. Bars
are participants and points compare with the models. b) Sequential dependence. Bars show the number of edits made
by participants between successive judgments. Lines compare with the models. c) Quality of participants’ and simu-
lated learners’ intervention choices in the three variable problems as in Figure 5b. d) The proportion of interventions of
different types chosen by participants compared to simulated learners in the three variable problems, otherwise as in
Figure 5d.
aspects of uncertainty. To test this idea more thoroughly, in the final problem in Experiment 2
we explicitly probed participants’ beliefs about their intervention choices through eliciting free
responses which we go on to code and compare to our model predictions.
Methods
Participants
111 UCL undergraduates (mean ± SD age 18.7 ± 0.9, 22 male) took part in Experiment 2
as part of a course. They were incentivised to be accurate based on randomly selected trials
as before, but this time with the opportunity to win Amazon™ vouchers rather than money.
Participants were split randomly into 8 groups of mean size 13.8 ± 3.4, each of which was
presented with a different condition in terms of the value of w and the way that they had to
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register their responses.
Design and procedure
Experiment 2 used the same task interface as the other experiments, but focused just on
the three variable problems (devices 1-5) and an additional device (6) in which none of the
components was connected (Figure 9). Like in Experiment 1, there were two causal strength
conditions wS ∈ [0.9, 0.75] and two background noise conditions wB ∈ [0.1, 0.25]. However,
unlike Experiment 1, participants were not trained on these parameters, but only told that: “the
connections do not always work”, and “sometimes components can activate by chance”.
To assess the extent the different reporting conditions drove lower sequential dependence
in Bramley, Lagnado, and Speekenbrink (2015) relative to Experiment 1, we examined two
reporting conditions between subjects: remain and disappear. In the remain condition, judgments
stayed on the screen into the next test, so participants did not have to change anything if they
wanted to register the same judgment at t as at t − 1. In the disappear condition, the previous
judgment disappeared as soon as participants entered a new test. They then had explicitly to
make a choice for every connection after each test.
In addition to the structure judgments and interventions, we also elicited additional prob-
ability measures from participants. First, after selecting a test, but before seeing the outcome,
participants were asked to predict what would happen to the variables they had left free. To
do this they would set a slider for each variable they had left free to vary. The left pole of the
slider was labeled “Sure off”, the right pole “Sure on”and the middle setting indicated max-
imal uncertainty (Figure 8a). Second, after drawing their best guess about the causal model
by setting each edge between the variables, participants were asked how sure they were about
each edge. Again they would respond by setting a slider, this time between “Guess” on the left
indicating maximal uncertainty and “Sure” on the right indicating high confidence that edge
judgment was correct (Figure 8b). Participants were trained and tested on interpretation of the
slider extremes and midpoints in an additional interactive page during the instructions.
Participants faced the six devices in random order, with six tests per device followed by
feedback as in Experiments 1 and 2. Then they faced one additional test problem. On this
problem, the true structure was always a chain (Figure 9, device 7). On this final problem, par-
ticipants did not have to set sliders. Instead, after they selected each test, but before seeing its
outcome, they were asked why they had selected that intervention. Labels would appear on
the nodes and participants were invited to “Explain why you chose this combination of fixed and
unfixed components. Use labels ‘A’ ‘B’, ‘C’ to talk about particular components or connections” in a
text box that would appear below the device. Responses were constrained to be at least 5 char-
acters long. The chain (device 3) was chosen for this problem because in Bramley, Lagnado,
and Speekenbrink (2015) and Experiments 1 and 2, participants often did not select the cru-
cial Do[x = 1, y = 0] intervention that would allow them to distinguish a chain from a fully
connected model (device 5) making this an interesting case for exploring divergence between
participants’ behavior and ideal active learning.
Finally, at the end of the experiment participants were asked to estimate the reliability wS
of the true connections: “In your opinion, how reliable were the devices? i.e. How frequently would
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a) b)
Figure 8: Exp 2: Unknown strengths; additional measures - a) Outcome expectation sliders b) Edge confidence sliders.
fixing a cause component ON make the effect component turn ON too?” and the level of background
noise wB : “In your opinion, how frequently did components activate by themselves (when they were
not fixed by you, or caused by any of the device’s other components)?” by setting sliders between
“0% (never)” and “100% (always)”.
A demo of Experiment 2 can be viewed at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/lagnado-lab/el/
ns sup.
Results and discussion
Judgments
As in the experiments where participants were trained on w, accuracy was significantly
higher than chance in all conditions (all 8 t statistics > 6.1 all p values < 0.001) and under-
performed a Bayes optimal observer observing the same data as them. Because the noise was
unspecified, we explored several reasonable priors on w (always assuming that wS and wB
were independent) when computing posteriors. Firstly, we considered a uniform-uniform prior
that made no assumptions about either wS or wB (UU) where w ∼ Uniform(0, 1)2. We also
considered a strong-uniform (SU) variant, following (Yeung & Griffiths, 2011), expecting causes
to be reliable – wS ∼ Beta(2, 10), but making no assumptions about background noise – wB ∼
Uniform(0, 1). Additionally, we considered a sparse-strong (SS) variant following Lu et al (2008),
encoding an expectation of high edge reliability – wS ∼ Beta(2, 10), and relatively little back-
ground noise – wB ∼ Beta(10, 2). The choice of parameter prior made little difference to the
Bayes optimal observer’s judgment accuracy. Thus participants significantly underperformed
the Bayes optimal observer in all conditions regardless of the assumed prior, except for condi-
tion wS = 0.75;wB = 0.1, remain) under the SU prior, and wS = 0.75;wB = 0.25, remain under
all three considered priors.
Comparison with known strength experiments
Performance in Experiment 2 was comparable to the 3-variable problems in Experiment 1
where the underlying w conditions were identical. Mean accuracy was actually slightly higher
0.61±0.21 compared to 0.56±0.21 for the matched problems in Experiment 1, although not sig-
nificantly so t(229) = 1.9, p = .054. This suggests that participants were able make reasonable
structure judgments without knowledge of the exact parameters. We found that participants’
final judgments of wS and wB and best fitting estimates assuming rational updating w∗S and
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w∗B suffered bias and variance (Figure 10 b).
17
As with Experiments 1 and 2, participants were not affected by the reliability of the connec-
tions themselves wS t(106) = 0.88, p = 0.37 but were affected by higher levels of background
noise wB t(108) = 2.7, p = 0.008. There was no difference in performance between the two
judgment elicitation conditions t(108) = 0.67, p = 0.50.
Participants were no more or less accurate on the final problem when identifying a chain
structure for the second time (device 7). The most frequent error once again was mistaking the
chain structure for the fully connected structure, made by 17/111 participants, although this
was reduced to 11/111 when facing the chain structure again on device 7, with only a single
participant making the same error twice.
Average edit distance between sequential judgments about the same device was signifi-
17Fifty-eight participants’ final wB judgments were incorrectly stored, so the N for wB judgments was 53 rather than
111.
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Figure 11: Experiment 2: Unknown strengths; performance and interventions. Subplots as in Figure 7.
cantly increased by removing the record of previous judgments between trials, going from .73
in the remain condition to 1.0 in the disappear condition t(109) = 3.5, p < .001. Edit distances
even in the disappear condition were still significantly lower than those predicted by UU, SU
or SS posterior or random sampling (all p’s < .001). As in Experiment 1 there was a strong
negative relationship between number of edits and performance F (1, 109) = 102, β = 6.4, η2 =
.48, p < .001. The edit-distance–performance relationship interacted weakly with condition
t(108) = 1.9, β = 1.3, p = .049 becoming stronger in the disappear condition. Again, the 71
participants who scored significantly above chance ( 1221 or higher by χ
2 test) had lower edit
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distances of 0.66± 0.29 than the remaining 40 participants’ 1.3± 0.44.
Additional measures
Participants’ edge confidence judgments increased significantly over trials χ2(1) = 2060, β =
.04, SE = .0008, p < .001, going from .57 ± .20 on the first trial to .78 ± .19 by the final trial.
The probability of changing an edge at the next time point was weakly inversely related to the
learners’ reported confidence in it χ2(1) = 67, β = −.03, SE = .004, p < .001. Reported edge
confidences were correlated with both the conditional probability of the edge states given the
the rest of the current model rcond =.20 and the marginal probability of the edge-state in the full
posterior under the UU prior rmar =.17 but these correlations did not differ significantly.
As predicted, reported outcome predictions were more closely related to the predictive dis-
tribution under the participants’ latest structure judgment bt−1: χ2(1) = 1044, β = .35, SE =
.010, p < .001 than marginalized over the full posterior χ2(1) = 580, β = .29, SE = .012, p <
.001. The latest-structure to prediction relationship was significantly stronger than the marginal
posterior to prediction relationship by Cox test Z = 10.9, p < .001.
Interventions
The overall distribution of intervention choices was broadly similar to the other Experi-
ments (Figure 11). “One-on” interventions were the most frequently chosen, making up 39% of
selections. However, unlike the previous Experiments, and consistent with edge focused learn-
ing, the constrained “one-on one-off” interventions were almost as common as single “one-on”
interventions, making up 38% of tests compared to 12% across 3-variable problems in Exper-
iment 1. The intervention selections and informativeness of intervention sequences were not
closely consistent with global expected information, nor any single type of local focus, but
could again be consistent with a mixture of local effect focused, edge focused and confirmation
focused queries.
Free explanations
For device 7, participants gave free explanations for their intervention choices on each of
their six tests. The overall distribution of intervention choices did not differ significantly from
the original presentation of the chain (device 3) χ2 = 31, p = 0.21 suggesting that the differ-
ent response format did not affect the intervention choices that participants made. In order
to assess what the explanations tell us about participants’ intervention choices, we asked two
independent coders to categorize the free responses into 8 categories. The categories were cho-
sen in a partly data-driven, partly hypothesis-driven way: 1. An initial set of categories were
selected, with the goal of distinguishing the approximations introduced in A local uncertainty
schema from global strategies like uncertainty sampling or expected information maximization.
2. A subset of the data was then checked and the categories were refined to better delineate
their responses with minimal membership ambiguity.
The eight resulting categories were:
1. The participant just wanted to learn about one specific connection. [Corresponding to
edge focused testing]
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2. The participant wanted to learn about two specific connections.
3. The participant wanted to learn about all three connections. [Corresponding to globally
focused testing]
4. The participant wanted to learn what a particular component can affect but did not men-
tion a specific pattern of connections. [Corresponding to effect focused testing]
5. The participant wanted to test / check / confirm their current hypothesis. [Correspond-
ing to confirmatory testing]
6. The participant wanted to learn about the randomness in the system (as opposed to the
location of the connections). [Corresponding to a focus on learning about noise rather
than structure]
7. The participant chose randomly / by mistake / to use up unwanted tests / they say they
did not understand what they are doing /it is clear they were not engaging with the task.
8. The participant’s explanation was complex / underspecified / did not seem to fall in any
of the above categories.
A supplementary file (available at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/lagnado-lab/el/ns sup)
contains all the materials given to coders and the full set of participant responses. Coders were
permitted to assign more than one category per response, but had to select a primary category.
When the category referred to particular component label(s), the rater would record these, and
when it referred to a specific connection they would record which direction (if specified) and
the components involved. These details will be used to facilitate a quantitative comparison
between participants’ explanations and our model fits in the next Section. Raters normally just
selected one category per response, selecting additional categories on only 8% of trials. Inter-
rater agreement on the primary category was 0.73, and Cohen’s κ = 0.64 ± 0.04, both higher
than their respective heuristic criteria for adequacy of 0.7 and 0.6 (Krippendorff, 2012; Landis
& Koch, 1977).
Figure 12, shows the proportion of responses in the different categories across the six trials.
On the first trial participants were most likely to be categorized as 4. – focused on identifying
what a particular variable could effect. On subsequent trials they most frequently categorized
as 1. – focusing on learning about a specific connection. Toward the end, explanations became
more diverse and were increasingly categorized as 5. – confirmatory testing or 6. learning
about the noise in the system. Individuals almost always gave a range of different explanations
across their six tests, falling under 3.0 ± 0.99 different categories on average, with only 5/111
participants providing explanations from the same category all six times (3 all-fours, 1 all-
threes. and 1 all-eights).
Explanation type was predictive of performance F (8, 657) = 13.75, η2 = 0.14, p < 0.001.
Taking category 7 – unprincipled or random intervening – as the reference category with low
average performance of 10.2 points out of a possible 21, categories 1,2,4,5, and 6 were all asso-
ciated significantly higher final scores [14.5, 12.9, 13.9, 13.9, 13.9] points, all p’s < 0.001.
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Figure 12: Experiment 2: Unknown strengths; free explanations for interventions agreed codes over the six tests in
problem 7.
Summary of Experiments
In all these experiments, participants were clearly able to generate plausible causal models
but also did so suboptimally. Averaged across participants, final model judgments resembled
the posterior over models (e.g. Figures 4c and 9c), however individuals’ trajectories typically
exhibited strong sequential dependence, with the probability of moving to a new model de-
creasing with its edit distance from the previous model. This is consistent with our hypothesis
that individuals normally maintain a single hypothesis and update it piece by piece. As found
in previous research, participants were worst at separating the direct and indirect causes in
the chain (3; 8) and fully-connected (5; 10) models. A closer look at participants’ intervention
choices suggests that this was due to a common failure to generate the constrained interven-
tions, such as Do[x = 1, y = 0], necessary to disambiguate these options. The simple endorser
model predicts this error by proposing that people ignore the dependencies between the dif-
ferent edges. Our framework provides a more nuanced explanation. Whether a learner will
correctly disambiguate these options depends on whether they focus on x − z before or after
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having inferred x → y and y → z. If the consider x− z after, then they will tend to fix y “off”,
realizing it is necessary to prevent the indirect path from confounding the outcome of their test.
However, if they have no connection marked from x to y or from y to z, they will not expect
this confounding activation and so have no motivation to fix y “off” when testing x− z.
Participants’ overall distributions of intervention selections resembled a mixture of edge, ef-
fect and confirmation focused testing, but their distributions of choices were relatively invariant
across conditions and trials while the efficient learners’ were much more dynamic. Compari-
son with the final global information gathered revealed that they did not select which variables
to target particularly efficiently, leading to a considerable discrepancy between the total infor-
mation gathered by participants compared to an ideal active learner. However, participants
also displayed hints of adaptation of strategy over the trials: with a preference for confirma-
tory testing, being more likely to fix variables “on” when they had children according to their
latest hypothesis bt−1, and displaying a modest shift toward more constrained interventions in
later trials.
In Experiment 2 we saw that people were able to identify causal structure effectively with-
out specific parameter knowledge. Comparing a range of plausible prior assumptions about
edge reliability wS and the level of background noise wB yielded little difference in judgment
or intervention choice predictions. Participants’ overall judgment accuracy was not affected by
the remain/disappear reporting condition, but this did affect sequential dependence, especially
for lower performers who may have often forgotten their previous judgment when making
their next one. The idea, common to the three judgment rules we consider, that people repre-
sent one model at a time was also supported by the additional measures elicited from partici-
pants during the task. With a single hypothesis rather than distributional beliefs, intervention
outcome predictions could only be generated by the current hypothesis rather than averaged
and weighted over all possible models. Consistent with this idea, we found participants’ expec-
tation judgments were more in line with their current hypothesis than the marginal likelihoods,
although we note that these measures were quite noisy and the effects quite small.
Modeling individual behavior
Across all three examined experiments we found a qualitative correspondence, both be-
tween our Neurath’s ship simulations and participants’ judgments, and between the two stage
local intervention schema and participants interventions. However, both simple endorsement
and win-stay, lose-sample also appeared to do a good job of capturing qualitative judgment pat-
terns. In order to validate quantitatively which of these models better describes participants’
behavior, we fit the models to the data and assessed their competence relative also to win-stay,
lose-sample and simple endorsement. By fitting the models separately to individual participants
we also assessed individual differences in learning behavior, and thus gained a finer-grained
picture of the processes involved.
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Judgments
Models
We compared six models to participants judgments, the three process models we consid-
ered in the experiment Neurath’s ship (NS), simple endorser (SE), win-stay,lose-sample (WSLS),
alonside an efficient Bayesian learner (Rational) and two null models Baseline and NS-RE.
For NS, we fit three parameters:
1. An average search length parameter λ controlling the probability of searching for differ-
ent lengths k on each belief update.
2. A search behavior parameter ω controlling how strongly the learner moves toward the
more likely state for an edge when updating it (recalling that ω = 1 leads to probability
matching, while ω =∞ leads to deterministic hill climbing and ω = 0 to making random
local edits).
3. A lapse parameter  controlling a mixture between the model predictions and a uniform
distribution.
Including the last parameter into equation 5, this resulted in the following equation
P (bt = m|Dtr, Ctr,w, bt−1, ω, λ) = (1− )
∑∞
0
λke−λ
k!
[(Rωt )
k]bt−1m + Unif(M) (13)
where R is a Markov matrix expressing the options for local improvement.
We operationalized the Simple endorser (SE) (Bramley, Lagnado, & Speekenbrink, 2015) with
two parameters. One is the probability ρ ∈ [0, 1] with which the belief state is updated from
bt−1 include extra edges from any currently fixed “on” node(s) to any activated nodes and to
exclude edges from any currently fixed “on” node(s) to any non-activated nodes (we write
bt−1+SE). With the complementary probability 1 − ρ, it stays the same as bt−1. As with the NS
model we also included a lapse parameter mixing in a probability of choosing something at
random, giving
P (bt = m|d,w) = (1− )(ρ bt−1+SE + (1− ρ)bt−1) + Unif(M) (14)
Win-stay, lose-sample (WSLS) (Bonawitz et al., 2014) predicts that participants stick with their
current model bt−1 with probability p(dt|bt−1,w, ct) or else draw a sample from the full pos-
terior with probability 1 − p(dt|bt−1,w, ct). The fitted version of this model had a single lapse
parameter  giving
P (bt = m|Dt,w) = (1−)
(
(1−P (dt|bt−1,w, ct))P (M |Dt,w)t+P (dt|bt−1,w, ct)[m = bt−1]
)
+Unif(M)
(15)
The final model, Rational was a variant of the Bayes-optimal observer (Section 2) that at-
tempted to select the maximum a posteriori causal structure maxP (M |Dt,w;Ct) with each
judgment, with a soft maximization (Luce, 1959) governed by inverse temperature parameter
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θ and a lapse parameter . For this, we considered
P (bt = m|Dt,w) = (1− ) exp(P (M |D
t,w)tθ)∑
m′∈M exp(P (m′|Dt,w)tθ)
+ Unif(M) (16)
Baseline is a parameter-free baseline that assumes each judgment to be a random draw from
all possible causal models
p(bt = m) = Unif(M) (17)
(leading to a probability of approximately 13 for each edge).
One concern with this baseline is that judgments might exhibit sequential dependence yet
be unrelated to data Dtr. Therefore we also considered a baseline variant of the NS model in
which the search behavior parameter ω was fixed to 0, resulting in a (R)andom (E)dit model
(NS-RE) that walks randomly around the hypothesis space for k steps on each update. For this
model, small k simply denotes more inertia.
Each of these belief models output a likelihood based on the probability that the model
assigns to a belief of bt, given the most recent outcome dt (SE), outcomes since the last belief
change Dtr (NS), or all outcomes Dt (WSLS, Rational), and the most recent judgment bt−1. Be-
cause the choice of prior for Experiment 2 made negligible difference to our results, we only
report models assuming uniform (UU) priors on w. For Experiment 2, we also marginalized
over the unknown values of w rather than conditioning as in the other experiments as detailed
in Appendix B.
Evaluation
To compare these models quantitatively, we used maximum likelihood optimization as im-
plemented by R’s optim function to fit the model separately to each of the 370 participants
across all three experiments.18 We used Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC, Schwarz, 1978) to
compare the models while accommodating their differing numbers of parameters. Baseline acts
as the null model for computing BICs and pseudo-R2s (Dobson, 2010) for the other models. In
Bramley, Lagnado, and Speekenbrink (2015) participants were not forced to select something
for each edge immediately, although once they did so they could not return to “unspecified”,
and they could also respond with cyclic causal model if they wanted. Therefore, we fit only the
75% of tests where the participants report a fully specified non-cyclic belief, taking the bt−1 to
be the unconnected model on the first fully specified judgment, as we do with b0 in the other
Experiments. Recalculating the transition probabilities on the fly in the optimization of ω was
infeasibly computationally intensive for the four-variable problems. So for Experiment 1 we
first fit all three parameters to the three-variable problems only, then used the best fitting ω
parameters from this fit when fitting the λ and  on the full data. In Bramley, Lagnado, and
Speekenbrink (2015) and Experiment 2 we were able to fit all three parameters.
Results and discussion
Table 3 details the results of the model fits to all experiments. Summed across all partic-
ipants, NS has the lowest total BIC (93381) with the SE in second place (94326), followed by
18In Appendix B we provide additional detail on how the models were fit.
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WSLS with (97643), then NS-RE (101837), Rational (1207209) and finally Baseline with (149313).
NS was also the best fitting model for Bramley, Lagnado, and Speekenbrink (2015) and Experi-
ment 1, with SE winning in Experiment 2. Thus, all three heuristics substantially beat an exact
Bayesian inference account of causal judgment here, but Neurath’s ship, with its ability to cap-
ture a graded dependence on prior beliefs, outperformed WSLS substantially, and the heuristic
SE to a lesser degree. In terms of number of individuals best fit, Table 3 shows a broad spread
across models: WSLS – 102, NS – 85, SE – 80, NS-RE – 70, Rational – 28 , Baseline – 4.
Table 3: Belief Model Fits.
Bramley, Lagnado, and Speekenbrink (2015)
Model λ
M
λ
SD
ω
M
ω
SD
θ
M
θ
SD
ρ
M
ρ
SD

M

SD
N fit M acc logL R2 BIC
Baseline 1 0.27 -17836 0 35672
NS-RE 0.17 51.5 0.21 0.19 32 0.36 -9379 0.49 19762
SE 0.18 0.18 0.21 0.24 13 0.60 -8819 0.53 18642
WSLS 0.14 0.28 56 0.85 -9117 0.52 18736
NS 1.20 100.1 6 243.8 0.05 0.20 27 0.66 -8197 0.56 17901
Rational 5 124.8 0.00 0.39 10 0.93 -12089 0.36 25182
Exp 1: Learning larger models
Model λ
M
λ
SD
ω
M
ω
SD
θ
M
θ
SD
ρ
M
ρ
SD

M

SD
N fit M acc logL R2 BIC
Baseline 1 0.33 -41814 0 83628
NS-RE 1.23 1.5 0.25 0.28 33 0.55 -29235 0.30 59490
SE 0.51 0.32 0.56 0.29 30 0.49 -27736 0.34 56492
WSLS 0.32 0.34 29 0.52 -28772 0.31 58053
NS 1.63 1.7 4 241.0 0.20 0.29 27 0.56 -27234 0.35 55896
Rational 13 143.2 0.14 0.36 0 -36362 0.13 73743
Exp 2: Unknown strengths
Model λ
M
λ
SD
ω
M
ω
SD
θ
M
θ
SD
ρ
M
ρ
SD

M

SD
N fit
rem/diss
M acc logL R2 BIC
rem/diss
Baseline 0/2 0.21 -15006 0 14330/15682
NS-RE 0.9 3 0.10 0.29 3/2 0.36 -10877 0.28 10050/12535
SE 0.80 0.30 0.43 0.27 21/16 0.75 -9181 0.39 8257 /10936
WSLS 0.00 0.31 9/8 0.50 -10220 0.32 9402/11452
NS 1.8 121 9.2 247 0.03 0.20 13/18 0.55 -9170 0.39 8620/10964
Rational 31.5 282 0.00 0.26 7/12 0.70 -10482 0.30 10116/11678
Note: Columns: M = median estimated parameters across all participants, SD = standard deviation of parameter
estimate across all participants, N fit = number of participants best fit by each model, M acc = average proportion of
edges identified correctly by participants best fit by this model, LogL = total log likelihood of model over all
participants, R2 = median McFadden’s pseudo-R2 across all participants, BIC = aggregate Bayesian information
criterion across all participants. For Exp 2, rem = remain condition, diss =disappear condition. Best fitting model
denoted with boldface.
The diversity of individual fits across strategies raises the question of the identifiability
of the different models. To assess how reliably genuine followers of the different proposed
strategies would be identified by our modeling procedure, we simulated participants using
the fitted parameters for each model for each of the actual participants in all three examined
experiments. We then fit all six models to these simulated participants report the rates at which
simulations are best-captured by each model. Table 4 provides the complete results for this re-
covery analysis. Overall, the generating model was recovered 74% of the time for Bramley,
Lagnado, and Speekenbrink (2015), 82% for Experiment 1 and 75% for Experiment 2 (chance
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would be 17%). In all three experiments, data generated by Baseline, WSLS and SE was nearly
always correctly recaptured, indicating that we can treat cases where participants are well de-
scribed by these models as genuine. Additionally NS almost never captured data generated by
any of the other models, providing reassurance that NS is not simply fitting participants who
are doing something more in line with SE or WSLS. However, data actually generated by NS
was frequently recaptured by the NS-RE (random edit) null model that makes NS-style local
edits but does not preferentially approach more likely models. This was true in the majority
of cases in Bramley, Lagnado, and Speekenbrink (2015) and Experiment 2. Some of the cases
where NS-RE captures NS-generated simulations are based on participants who were better
described by NS-RE in the first place (e.g. whose search behavior was too random to justify
ω’s inclusion). We find a similar effect whereby simulated Rational participants with relatively
low θs or high s are more parsimoniously described by Baseline. This is supported by looking
at the more complex four variable problems in Experiment 1, NS simulations were identified
the majority of the time, and when restricted to simulations based on parameters from par-
ticipants who were actually best described by NS, 24/27 were recovered successfully. Thus it
is plausible that some of the 70 NR-RE participants were infact doing something more in line
with NS. There is a suggestion of this in Experiment 1, where the mean accuracy of the NS-RE
participants is commensurate with SE, WSLS and NS.
The performance of a handful of participants – 10 in Bramley, Lagnado, and Speekenbrink
(2015), and 19 in Experiment 2 – were best fit by the Rational model, which has one fewer pa-
rameter than NS. Naturally, these participants performed particularly well, scoring near ceiling
in Bramley, Lagnado, and Speekenbrink (2015) (identifying 14.0 of the 15 connections) and as
high as the ideal learning simulations in Experiment 2 – 14.7/21 compared to an average of
15.5 for perfect Bayesian integration. This, along with the lower recovery rates for these exper-
iments, suggests that their design – both being motivated primarily to look closely at interven-
tion choice – may not have been difficult enough to separate the process from the normative
predictions about the judgments.
Figures 13a and b show the range of the fitted λ and ω parameters under NS. In line with
our predictions, participants’ average fitted search lengths (λ) were mainly small, with me-
dians between 1 and 2 in all three experiments.19 Because this parameter merely encodes a
participant’s average search length this means that the same participant would sometimes not
search at all, staying exactly where they are (k = 0), or might also sometimes search much
longer (e.g. k  λ). The median fitted ωs of 6, 4 and 9.2 across the three experiments are
suggestive of moderate hill-climbing. A substantial number of participants had very large val-
ues of ω indicative of near-deterministic hill climbing. We discuss this trade-off further in the
General Discussion. However, note that we were only able to fit these values to the easier three
variable problems. It might be that the largest values would have been tempered if they could
have been fit to the four variable problems as well.
19A few participants made judgments that were sequentially anti-correlated leading to λ parameters at the limit of
the optimization routine’s precision and correspondingly large standard deviations in Experiments 1 and 2.
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Table 4: Belief Model Recovery Analysis
Bramley, Lagnado, and Speekenbrink (2015)
All simulated participants Best fit participants
Baseline Rational WSLS SE NS-RE NS Baseline Rational WSLS SE NS-RE NS
Baseline 134 0 4 0 1 0 Random 1 0 0 0 0 0
Rational 39 95 4 0 0 1 Rational 0 10 0 0 0 0
WSLS 5 0 133 1 0 0 WSLS 0 0 56 0 0 0
SE 1 0 2 119 17 0 SE 0 0 0 13 2 0
NS-RE 2 0 1 53 82 1 NS-RE 0 0 1 9 20 0
NS 3 0 3 11 72 50 NS 0 0 1 1 16 9
Exp 1: Learning larger models
All simulated participants Best fit participants
Baseline Rational WSLS SE NS-RE NS Baseline Rational WSLS SE NS-RE NS
Baseline 114 1 3 0 2 0 Baseline 1 0 0 0 0 0
Rational 42 75 2 0 1 0 Rational 0 0 0 0 0 0
WSLS 4 1 115 0 0 0 WSLS 1 1 27 0 0 0
SE 6 0 9 94 11 0 SE 0 0 1 31 0 0
NS-RE 2 0 1 3 112 2 NS-RE 0 0 0 1 29 1
NS 3 0 3 2 30 82 NS 0 0 0 0 4 23
Exp 2: Unknown strengths
All simulated participants Best fit participants
Baseline Rational WSLS SE NS-RE NS Baseline Rational WSLS SE NS-RE NS
Baseline 107 1 3 0 0 0 Baseline 2 0 0 0 0 0
Rational 17 92 2 0 0 0 Rational 1 18 0 0 0 0
WSLS 7 0 100 2 2 0 WSLS 1 0 16 0 1 0
SE 9 0 6 93 3 0 SE 0 0 0 30 0 0
NS-RE 9 0 8 3 89 2 NS-RE 0 0 0 0 5 0
NS 5 2 9 2 70 23 NS 0 2 3 0 22 10
Note: Rows denote simulation rule, and columns the model used to fit the simulated choices. The number in each cell shows how
many of the simulations using this rule were best fit by that model. Right hand side restricts this to simulations using the parameters
taken from participants who were actually best fit by each model. Boldface denotes the model most frequently best fit in each case.
Interventions
Models
We compared our local model of intervention choice (Section 4) to a globally-focused and a
baseline model. Each intervention model output a likelihood for an intervention choice of ct,
depending on Dtr, Ctr and bt−1.
We compared the overall distribution of participants’ intervention selections and final per-
formance with edge focused, effect focused and confirmation focused tests. We found that none of
these models alone closely resembled participants’ response patterns, but overall distributions
were consistent with a mixture of different types of local tests. This was also supported by
the the free-response coding in Experiment 2, showing that participants would typically report
targeting a mixture of specific edges, effects of specific variables and confirming the current
hypothesis. Therefore, we considered four locally driven intervention selection models, one
for each of the three foci, plus a mixture.
For the edge model, the possible foci L included the 3 (or 6) edges in the model. For the ef-
fect model, it comprised the 3 components (or 4 in the 4-variable case). The confirmation model
always had the same focus – comparing bt to null b0 of no connectivity. The mixed model con-
tained all 7 (or 11) foci. As in Equations 8 and 9 in Section 4, each model would first compute a
soft-max probability of choosing each possible focus lt ∈ L. Within each chosen focus it would
also calculate the soft-max probability of selecting each intervention, governed by another in-
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verse temperature parameter η ∈ [0,∞]. The total likelihood of the next intervention choice
was thus a soft-maximization-weighted average of choice probabilities across possible focuses
P (ct|η, ρ,Dtr, bt−1,w) =
∑
l∈L
P (c|l, η, bt−1,w) exp(H(l|D
t
r, b
t−1,w; Ctr)ρ)∑
l′∈L exp(H(l′|Dtr, bt−1,w; Ctr)ρ)
(18)
where
P (c|l, η, bt−1,w) = exp
(
Ed∈Dct
[
∆H(l|d, bt−1,w; c] η)∑
c′∈C exp (Ed∈Dc [∆H(l|d, bt−1,w; c′] η)
(19)
Positive values of ρ ∈ [−∞,∞] encode a preference for focusing on areas where the learner
should be most uncertain, ρ = 0 encodes random selection of local focus, and negative ρ en-
codes a preference for focusing on areas where the learner should be most certain.
For comparison, Baseline is a parameter-free model that assumed each intervention was a
random draw from all possible interventions
P (ct) = Unif(C) (20)
Global is a variant of the globally efficient intervention selection (Section 2) that attempted to se-
lect the globally most informative greedy test arg maxc∈C Ed∈Dc
[
∆H(M |d, Dt−1,w;Ct−1, c)].
It has one inverse temperature parameter θ ∈ [0,∞] governing soft maximization (Luce, 1959)
over the global expected information gains. For this, we considered
P (ct|Dt−1,w;Ct−1) = exp(Ed∈Dct
[
∆H(M |d, Dt−1,w; ct)] θ)∑
c∈C exp(Ed∈Dc [∆H(M |d, Dt−1,w; c)] θ)
(21)
As with the belief modeling, for Experiment 2 we marginalized over the the unknown val-
ues of w rather than conditioning as in Experiments 1-2 as detailed in Appendix B.
Evaluation
All six models were fit to the data from all three experiments in the same way as the belief
models. The results are detailed in Table 5.
Additionally, to compare model predictions of local focus choice lt to participants’ self re-
ports in problem 7 in Experiment 2, we computed the likelihood of each local focus prediction
on each test. This was done by calculating P (c|l, η, bt−1,w) for each of the local foci we con-
sidered, using a fixed common η = 20 to capture strong but nondeterministic preference for
the most useful intervention(s). For each data point ct, we then calculated which lt assigned
the most probability to ct the intervention actually chosen by the participant. Figure 14 plots
the most likely focus of participants’ intervention choices in the final problem against the code
assigned to their free responses.
Results and discussion
The mixed local focus model was the best fitting model over the three experiments with the
lowest total BIC of 97757, followed by effects then by the global focused model, then by edges and
finally by confirmation and then baseline. However, there was a great deal of individual vari-
ation, suggesting that a single model does not capture the population well. More participants
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Table 5: Intervention Model Fits
Bramley, Lagnado, and Speekenbrink (2015)
Model η M η SD ρ M ρ SD θ M θ SD N fit M acc logL R2 BIC
Baseline 3 0.38 -18262 36524
Edges 10.4 26 0.9 80 9 0.68 -14222 0.23 29338
Effects 7.7 16 0.5 5 82 0.71 -10701 0.41 22296
Confirmatory 3.9 74 9 0.43 -15368 0.14 31182
Mixed 15.1 152 0.7 33 32 0.66 -11145 0.39 23185
Global 6.1 4.1 4 0.85 -15619 0.14 31686
Exp 1: Learning larger models
Model η M η SD ρ M ρ SD θ M θ SD N fit M acc logL R2 BIC
Baseline 18 0.35 -32958 65917
Edges 9.3 138 25.9 1012 2 0.37 -28588 0.13 58196
Effects 6.2 39 1.5 6 31 0.59 -24213 0.27 49445
Confirmatory 3.8 8 24 0.49 -28721 0.13 57951
Mixed 8.8 139 17.6 414 27 0.61 -23944 0.27 48907
Global 4.9 4 18 0.66 -26652 0.19 53813
Exp 2: Unknown strengths
Model η M η SD ρ M ρ SD θ M θ SD N fit M acc logL R2 BIC
Baseline 14 0.35 -15365 30730
Edges 4.0 8 2.7 77 24 0.74 -13010 0.18 26850
Effects 3.2 9 2.9 218 7 0.52 -12992 0.14 26815
Confirmatory 2.5 14 12 0.46 -14180 0.04 28776
Mixed 3.9 9 5.4 285 15 0.63 -12550 0.17 25931
Global 3.0 8 39 0.70 -12850 0.14 26114
Note: Columns as in belief model (Table 3).
were best described by an effects focus (121) than a mixed focus (77), but each model received
some support, with 58, 43, 36 and 35 individuals best fit by global, confirmation and edge focused
and baseline models respectively. Additionally, the effect focus was was the best fitting model
overall in Bramley, Lagnado, and Speekenbrink (2015) where there was a strong tendency for
participants to fix a single variable on at a time.
As Table 5 shows, mixed was the best overall fitting model for Experiments 1 and 2, and the
majority of participants 277/370 were fit by one of the local uncertainty driven models. Fur-
thermore, Figure 14 shows that for effect and edge queries, there was a strong correspondence
between the most likely choice of focus l on Experiment 2 problem 7 and the coded explanation
of that intervention’s goal. This was not the case for tests where explanations were categorized
as confirmatory. These were most frequently best described as effect focused tests of the root
variable of the true model (labeled “x” in the plots).
As with the case of judgments, a moderate number of chance-level performing participants
(35/370) were best described by the Baseline model. However, 58 participants across the three
experiments were better described by the Globally efficient testing model than any local testing
models. However, these were not the highest performing participants in Experiment 2, with
lower average scores than those described by the edge focused model. This suggests that we do
not yet have a good model of these participants’ choices.
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Figure 13: Gaussian kernel densities over fitted model parameters for all participants. a) Search length λ and b) log
search behavior log(ω) according to Neurath’s ship belief update model. c) Local maximization parameter η and d) local
focus choice parameter ρ under mixed local uncertainty based model. Since we report all participants fits, there are some
extreme values — poorly described by either model — that are not plotted. Annotations give the number of parameters
above and below the range plotted.
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Figure 14: Model and free response correspondence. Each plot is for trials assigned a particular free response code,
each bar is for the number of trials for which that local focus was most likely given the intervention choice. Effect and
edge coded queries were also diagnosed as such by the model fitting while confirmatory coded queries were most likely
to be diagnosed as querying the effects of the root node(s) in the true model which always was (or included) x.
General Discussion
Actively learning causal models is key to higher-level cognition and yet is radically in-
tractable. We explored how people manage to identify causal models despite their limited
computational resources. In three experiments, we found that participants’ judgments some-
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what reflected the true posterior, while exhibiting sequential dependencies. Further, partici-
pants’ choices of interventions reflected average expected information, but were insufficiently
reactive to the evidence that had already been observed and were consistent with being locally
focused.
We could capture participants’ judgment patterns by assuming that they maintained a sin-
gle causal model rather than a full distribution. We proposed that participants considered local
changes to improve the ability of their single model to explain the latest data and compared
this account to two other proposals, one based on the idea that participants occasionally re-
sample from the full posterior, and the other, a heuristic based on ignoring the possibility of
indirect effects. While our Neurath’s ship proposal fit best overall, all three proposals had merit,
with simple endorsement winning out in Experiment 2 and more individuals better fit by win-stay
lose-sample.
We captured participants’ interventions by assuming they focused stochastically on differ-
ent local aspects of the overall uncertainty and tried to resolve these, leading to behavior that
was comparatively invariant to the prior. Our modelling suggested a broad spread of local
focuses both between and within participants.
By casting our modeling in the language of machine learning, we were able to make strong
connections between our Neurath’s ship model and established techniques for approximating
distributions–sequential Monte-Carlo particle filtering and MCMC (specifically Gibbs) sam-
pling. Likewise, we were able to explicate intervention selections using the language of ex-
pected uncertainty reduction but relaxing the assumption that the goal was the minimization
of global uncertainty in the full distribution. The combination of a single hypothesis (parti-
cle) and a Gibbs-esque search, nicely reflects the Neurath’s ship intuition that theory change is
necessarily piecemeal and that changes are evaluated against the backdrop of the rest of the
existing theory.
Limitations of Neurath’s ship
Like any theory, Neurath’s ship was evaluated against a backdrop of a number of assump-
tions. We discuss some of these here.
Measurement effects
In order to explore incremental belief change it was necessary to elicit multiple judgments
and to make two strong assumptions: (1) that these judgments reflected participants’ true and
latest beliefs; and (2) that the repeated elicitations did not fundamentally alter learning pro-
cesses. To mitigate problems of these, we both incentivised participants to draw their best and
latest guess at every time point during the tasks, and examined different reporting conditions
to explore the influence of the elicitations on the learning process.
In Bramley, Lagnado, and Speekenbrink (2015) and the remain condition in Experiment 2,
participants could leave parts of their hypothesis untouched if they did not want to change
them. This had the strength of being minimally invasive; it did not push the learner to re-
consider an edge that they would otherwise not have done merely because they have been
asked about it again. However this came at the cost of conflating genuine incremental change
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in the learner’s psychological representation with response laziness. To assuage this concern,
in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 disappear, we removed the participants’ previous judgment
after they had seen the outcome of the subsequent intervention, meaning that they would have
to remember and re-report any edges they had previously judged (and not yet reconsidered).
The slight reduction of dependence between remain and disappear conditions in Experiment 2,
is consistent with the idea that being forced to re-report edges made it more likely that they
would be reconsidered and potentially changed.
The Neurath’s ship approach is related to anchor-and-adjust models (Einhorn & Hogarth,
1986; Petrov & Anderson, 2005) of sequential magnitude estimation. Hogarth and Einhorn
found that when mean estimates are repeatedly elicited from participants as they see a se-
quence of numbers, the sequence of responses can be captured by a process whereby one stores
a single value and adjusts it a portion of the way toward each new observed value. When judg-
ments were elicited at the end of the sequence, participants behaved more like they had stored
a subset of the values and averaged them at the end. In the same way, we can think of Neu-
rath’s ship as a process in which the current model acts as an anchor, and adjustments are made
toward new data as it is observed. However, the higher complexity of causal inference, and
the greater storage requirements for the individual episodes will presumably lead to greater
pressure to use a sequential strategy rather than store. Arguably, step-by-step elicitation is a
closer analogue to real-world causal inference than end-of-sequence because causal beliefs are
presumably in frequent use while learning instances may be spread out, with no clear start or
end.
Acyclicity
We adopted the directed acyclic graph as our model of causal representation here because
it is a standard approach in the literature and is mathematically convenient. Furthermore,
cyclic graphs were quite rare choices in Bramley, Lagnado, and Speekenbrink (2015) (where
participants were permitted to draw them). Thus, we simply opted to to rule them out in the
instructions in later experiments.
However, in tasks where people draw causal models of real-world phenomena, they often
draw cyclic or reciprocal relationships (Kim & Ahn, 2002; Nikolic & Lagnado, 2015), and many
real world processes are characterized by bidirectional causality, such as supply and demand in
economics or homeostasis in biological systems. There are various ways to represent dynamic
systems. One proposal is the dynamic Bayesian network (Dean & Kanazawa, 1989), which can
be “unfolded” to form regular acyclic network with causal influences passing forward through
time. Another is the chain graph (Lauritzen & Richardson, 2002), in which undirected edges
are mixed with directed edges and used to model the equilibria of the cyclic parts of the system.
Exploring these structures would require a change in the the semantics of the experiment so
that people could understand what they were reporting in the presence of dynamical interac-
tions. However, given this, NS would offer a way of performing sequential, on-line, inference
for such structures, using standard likelihood calculations for dynamic Bayes nets and chain
graphs.
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Evaluation of evidence
Another pragmatic limitation of the current modeling was the assumption of the noisy-OR
functional form for the true underlying causal models. While we did take care to train partic-
ipants on the sources of noise in both Experiments and the exact values in Bramley, Lagnado,
and Speekenbrink (2015), our own past work suggests that people may have simpler ways of
evaluating the how likely models would be to produce different patterns – for example, in
Bramley, Dayan, and Lagnado (2015), we found participants’ judgments could be captured by
assuming they lumped sources of noise together and just counted the number of surprising
outcomes under each model.
One possibility is that people actually formed likelihood estimates through simulation with
an internal causal model. For instance, one might perform a mental intervention, activating
a component of one’s own internal causal model and keeping track of where the activation
propagates. By simulating multiple times, a learner could estimate the likelihood of different
outcomes under their current model (Hamrick, Smith, Griffiths, & Vul, 2015), and by simulating
under variations of the model, the learner could compare likelihoods generated on the fly.
This simulation-based view provides a possible explanation for why participants more readily
accommodated internal noise wS than background noise wB . The former can be “built in”
to the inferred connections in their model and reveal itself in mental simulation, while wB is
more of a mathematical “catch all” for all possible influences coming from outside the variables
under focus. The Neurath’s ship perspective suggests that people lean on their surrounding
network of assumptions about surrounding causes, controlling for these if they get in the way
of local inference. By being omnipresent and affecting all the variables equally wB was not
possible to accommodate in this way.
Future experiments and modeling might relax the assumption of noisy-OR likelihoods and
allow induction of more diverse functional forms, or focus on well known domains where
priors can be measured before the task. Another approach might be to render the noisy-OR
formalization more transparent by visualizing the sources of exogenous noise alongside the
target variables, for instance displaying varying numbers of nuisance background variables on
screen for different background noise conditions.
Antifoundationalism
The core of Neurath’s ship is the strong assumption that people consider only a single global
hypothesis and make local changes within this. This is the “antifoundationalism” captured by
the Duhem–Quine thesis — any local theoretical claim is necessarily supported by surrounding
assumptions. However, this may be too strong for some of the easier problems we considered
here where the worlds may have been small and constrained enough for some people to reason
at the global level. For the three variable problems in particular, some participants may have
been able to consider alternatives at the level of the whole model, and thus able to shift from
common cause to chain etc with a single step.
While participants’ judgments showed high sequential dependence, they did occasionally
change their model abruptly. The theory of unexpected uncertainty (Yu & Dayan, 2003), and
substantial work on changepoint tasks (Speekenbrink & Shanks, 2010) are associated with the
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notion that people will sometimes “start over” if they are having consistently poor predictions
from their existing model. This relates to the idea, in philosophy of science, of a “paradigm
shift” (Kuhn, 1962). The current Neurath’s ship models do not naturally capture this but accom-
modate occasional large jumps by assuming a variable search length (k), meaning the search
will sometimes be long enough to allow the learner to move to a radically different model in a
single update. However we might also extend the Neurath’s ship framework to include a thresh-
old on prediction accuracy below which a learner will start afresh, for example by randomly
sampling a model, or sampling from a hitherto unexplored part of the space. At present this is
captured by the  probability of sampling a new bt at random on a given trial (which ranged
between a probability of .03 in Experiment 2 and .2 in Experiment 1).
Selective memory
We assumed that participants’ judgment updates were based on the recent data Dtr, col-
lected since the last time they changed their hypothesis. This is quite frugal in the current
context, as the learner rarely has to store more than a few tests worth of evidence. It also cap-
tures the idea of semanticization – that as one gradually absorbs episodic evidence into one’s
hypothesis, it becomes safe to forget it.
However, the particular choice of Dtr is certainly a simplification. People may frequently
remember evidence from before their latest change, and fail to store recent evidence, especially
once their beliefs become settled. They might also collect summary evidence at the level of
individual edges, counting how often pairs of components activate together for example, or
remember evidence about some components but not others, or only store evidence when it
is surprising under the current model. In order to fit the models it was necessary to make
simplifying assumptions that captured some form of halfway house between remembering
everything and relying entirely on your hypothesis. Future studies might probe exactly what
learners can remember during and after learning to get a finer-grained understanding of the
trade-off between remembering evidence and absorbing it into beliefs.
Related to this, we fit a static search behavior parameter to participants, finding evidence
of moderate hill climbing. However, a more realistic depiction might be something more akin
to simulated annealing (Hwang, 1988). Learners might begin searching with more exploratory
moves ω ≈ 1 so as to explore the space broadly, and transition toward hill climbing ω = ∞ as
they start to choose what judgment to report. Alternatively they might gradually reduce their
search length k as pressure to settle on a model increases.
Alternative approximations and representations
The choice of Gibbs sampling, together with a single particle approximation, is just one
of numerous possible models of structure inference. For example we found (data not shown)
fairly good fits by replacing Gibbs sampling with a form of Metropolis-Hastings MCMC sam-
pling – using an MC3 proposal and acceptance distribution (Madigan & Raftery, 1994; Madi-
gan, York, & Allard, 1995). The two approaches make similar behavioral predictions but differ
somewhat in their internal architecture – a Metropolis-Hastings sampler would first generate a
wholesale alternative to the current belief, then make an accept-reject decision about whether
51
Running head: NEURATH’S SHIP
to accept this alternative, while the Gibbs sampler focuses on one subpart at a time and updates
this conditional on the rest. Ultimately, the Gibbs sampler did a better job, helping justify the
broader ideas of locality of inference implicit in the Neurath’s ship proposal.
An interesting alternative approach to complex model induction via local computations
(Fernbach & Sloman, 2009; Waldmann et al., 2008), comes from variational Bayes (Bishop, 2006;
Weierstrass, 1902). The idea behind this is that one can simplify inference by replacing an in-
tractable distribution, here the distribution over all possible models, with a simpler one which
has degrees of freedom that can be used to allow it to fit as best as possible. A common choice
of simpler distribution involves factorization, with a multiplicative combination of a set of
simpler parametrized distributions. Thus, for causal inference one might make a mean-field
approximation (Georges, Kotliar, Krauth, & Rozenberg, 1996) and suppose the true distribu-
tion over models factorizes into independent distributions for each causal connection. Diver-
gence between this approximation and the full model can then be minimized mathematically
by updating each of the local distributions in turn (Jaakkola, 2001). This provides a different
perspective on global inference based on local updates. Rather than a process of local search
where only a single model is represented at any time, variational Bayes suggests people main-
tain many local distributions and try to minimize the inconsistencies between them. The biases
induced by this process make the two approaches distinguishable in principle (Sanborn, 2015),
meaning that an interesting avenue for future work may be to design experiments that distin-
guish between the two approaches to approximation in cognition . The truth in our case may
be somewhere in between. For instance, in the current work, we assumed people were able to
use recent evidence to estimate their local uncertainty conditional on the rest of the structure,
and thus choose where to focus interventions. To the extent that learners really represent their
beliefs with lots of local uncertainties, their representation becomes increasingly variational.
Choosing interventions aboard Neurath’s ship
The largest difference in intervention choices between experiments was that in Experiment
2 constrained interventions (e.g. Do[x = 1, y = 0]) were chosen much more frequently. One
explanation for this is that participants might have been forced to focus their attention more
narrowly in Experiment 2, to compensate for their additional uncertainty about the noise by
using more focused testing. Another possibility is that the different subject pools drove this dif-
ference. It is possible that mTurk’s older and educationally diverse participants (Experiments
1) gathered evidence differently from the young scientifically trained UCL undergraduates (Ex-
periment 2). This might have driven the tendency toward more tightly constrained tests in in
Experiment 2.
The idea that people relied on asking a mixture of different types of locally focused ques-
tion, was borne out by our analysis of the coding of participants’ free explanations. Expla-
nations almost always focused on one specific aspect of the problem, most frequently on a
particular causal connection, or what a particular component can affect, but also sometimes on
parameter uncertainty or, on later tests, confirming their current hypothesis. Furthermore, par-
ticipants almost always referred to a mix of different local query types over the course of their
six tests. The apparent shift toward confirmatory testing on the last trial is sensible, since par-
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ticipants knew they would not have more tests to follow up anything new they might discover.
Indeed this shift would be normative in various settings.
Subjective explanations are notoriously problematic (Ericsson & Simon, 1980, 1993; Russo,
Johnson, & Stephens, 1989). Therefore, we must be careful in interpreting these results. One
common issue is that eliciting responses concurrently with performing a task can change be-
havior, invalidating conclusions about the original behavior. We minimized this issue by elic-
iting explanations just after each intervention was chosen, before its outcome was revealed.
Additionally, we did not find any difference in the distribution of interventions on the free
response trials and those chosen the first time participants identified the chains structure.
A second issue is that there are limits on the kinds of processes people can describe effec-
tively in natural language, with rule based explanations being typically easier to express than
those involving more complex statistical weighting and averaging. That is, even if someone
weighed several factors in coming to a decision, they might explain this by mentioning only
the most significant, or recently considered of these factors, falsely appearing to have relied
on a one-reason decision strategy. There is an active debate about this, including suggestions
that people’s explanations for their choices are, in general, post-hoc rationalizations rather than
genuine descriptions of process (Dennett, 1991; Johansson, Hall, Sikstro¨m, & Olsson, 2005), but
also refutations of this interpretation (Newell & Shanks, 2014).
In sum, taken with appropriate caution, we suggest that this analysis does provides a valu-
able window on participants’ subjective sense of their active testing, with their relatively spe-
cific focus on one aspect of the uncertainty at a time consistent with the idea that they rely on a
mixture of heuristic questions.
The models pinned down interventions less tightly than beliefs in the sense that there was
a great deal of spread in the individuals best fit across the models, and the proportional reduc-
tions in BIC were smaller. There are various possible reasons for this. Firstly, the models of
belief change generally predicted one or few likely models, whereas there are typically many
interventions of roughly equal informativeness to an ideal learner (see Figure 3), which could
be performed in many different orders. This sets the bar for predictability for interventions
much lower than for the causal judgments.
Secondly, to the extent that learners chose interventions based on a reduced encoding of the
hypothesis space, we are also forced to average over our additional uncertainty about exactly
which hypotheses or alternatives they were considering at the moment of choice (Markant &
Gureckis, 2010).
A third issue is that of whether and how learners represented current uncertainty, and re-
cruited this in choosing what to focus on. In the current work we assumed that learners were
somewhat able to track the current local uncertainties and use these to choose what to target
next. The modeling revealed that, relative to the local intervention schema, the majority of
participants did tend to focus on the areas of high current uncertainty (shown by the predom-
inantly positive ρ in Figure 13 d) but we do not yet have a model for how they did this. It is
plausible that learners used a heuristic to estimate their local confidence. For example, a sim-
ple option would be to accrue confidence in an edge, (or analogously in the the descendants
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of a variable or in the current hypothesis) for every search step for which it is considered and
remains unchanged, reducing confidence every time it changes. In this way confidence in lo-
cales that survive more data and search become stronger, approximately mimicking reduction
in local uncertainty.
We considered just three of a multitude of possible choices of local focus. These encom-
pass most extant proposals for human search heuristics, encapsulating modular (Markant et
al., 2015) constraint seeking (Ruggeri & Lombrozo, 2014) and confirmatory (Klayman & Ha,
1989) testing, placing all three within a unified schema and also showing that many learners
dynamically switch between them.
Participants’ free responses provided a complementary perspective, suggesting that even
initial tests were generated as solutions to uncertainty about some specific subpart of the over-
all uncertainty space – often the descendants of some particular variable or the presence of
some particular connection. This suggests that the the most important step in an intervention
selection may not be the final choice of action but the prior choice of what to focus on next. This
is captured in our model, under which the values of different interventions for a chosen focus
do not depend on Dt−1. This means learners need not do extensive prospective calculation
on every test but can learn gradually, for instance through experience and preplay (Pfeiffer
& Foster, 2013), which interventions are likely to be informative relative to generic types of
local focus. This knowledge could then be transferred to subsequent tests, and translated to
tests with different targets – e.g. if Do[x = 1] is effective for identifying the effects of x then
Do[y = 1] will be effective for identifying the effects of y.
It is worth noting from these data that even when participants’ interventions were relatively
uninformative from the perspective of ideal or even our heuristic learners, their explanations
would generally reveal that they were informative with respect to some other question or source
of uncertainty. For example, participants’ tests that were uninformative with respect to identi-
fying structure were often revealed, through our free response coding, to have been motivated
by a desire to reduce uncertainty about internal wS or background wB noise.20 From this per-
spective we might think of even the completely uninformative intervention choices (e.g. fixing
all the variables) as legitimate tests of illegitimate hypotheses – e.g.hypotheses that were out-
side of the space of possibilities we intended participants to consider – such as whether fixed
variables actually always took the states they were fixed to. More research is needed to ex-
plicate these internal steps leading up to an active learning action, but the implication based
on the current research is that the solution will not require that the learner evaluate all possi-
ble outcomes of all possible actions under all possible models, but rather reflect a mixture of
heuristics that can guide the gradual improvement of the learner’s current theory.
The navy of one
At the start we argued that our Neurath’s ship model could be seen as a single particle
combined with an MCMC search. As such, we are claiming Neurath’s ship as a form of bound-
20We might have extended the computational model of Bayesian inference to incorporate joint inference over models
and parameters which would have incorporated this aspect of testing. However, this would have complicated analyses
since participants were ultimately only incentivised to identify the right connections
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edly rational approximate Bayesian inference. However, it is important to consider the point at
which an approximation becomes so degenerate that it is merely a complicated way to describe
a simple heuristic. Many would argue that this line is crossed long before reaching particle fil-
ters containing a single particle, or Markov chains lasting only 1 or 2 steps. It is certainly a leap
to claim that such a process is calculating a proper posterior.
One alternative to starting from a normative computational level account and accepting a
distant algorithmic approximation, is to start from the algorithm, i.e., the simple rules, and con-
sider a computational account such as satisficing (Simon, 1982) that provides adequate license.
Our account shares two important problems with this, but avoids two others.
One shared problem is the provenance of the rules - i.e., the situation-specific heuristics. We
saw this in the manifold choice of local foci for the choice of intervention – we do not have an
account of whence these hail. This is a common problem in the context of the adaptive toolbox
(Gigerenzer, 2001) – it is hard to have a theory of the collection of tools.
A second shared problem follows on from this - namely how to choose which rule to apply
under which circumstance. In our case, this is evident again in the mixtures of local focus rules
– we were not able to provide a satisfying account of how participants make their selection
of focus on a particular trial. The meta-problem of choosing the correct heuristic is again a
common issue for satisficing approaches.
By contrast with a toolbox approach, though, our account smoothly captures varying de-
grees of sophistication between individuals. For instance, with the Take the best heuristic,
Gigerenzer, Todd, and ABC Research Group (1999) give an attractive description of one-reason
decision making that often outperforms regression in describing people’s decisions from mul-
tiple cues. However, subsequent analyses have revealed that participants behave somewhere
between the two (Newell & Shanks, 2003; Parpart, Jones, & Love, in revision) often using more
than one cue, but certainly less than all the information available. Thus to understand their
processing we must be able to express the halfway houses between ideal and overly simplistic
processing (Lieder & Griffiths, 2015). In the same way, the approximate Bayesian perspective
allows us to express different levels of approximation lying between fully probabilistic and
fully heuristic processing, with the simplest form of Neurath’s ship lying at the heuristic end
of this road.
A further benefit of our account is the ease of generalization between tasks. Heuristic mod-
els are typically designed for, and are competent at, specific paradigms. Since they lack a more
formal relationship with approximate rationality, they are hard to combine or often to apply in
different or broader circumstances.
Here, we assumed that learners made updates at the level of individual directed edges.
Again this is just one illustrative choice, but our model is consistent with the idea that the
learners altered beliefs by making changes local to arbitrary sub-spaces of an unmanageable
learning problem. We showed that so long as the learner’s updates are conditioned on the rest
of their model, and are appropriately balanced, the connection to approximate Bayesian infer-
ence can be maintained through the ideas of MCMC sampling and a single-particle particle
filter. A sophisticated learner might be able to update several edges of their causal model at a
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single time, with a more complex proposal distribution. However, on a larger scale this is still
likely to be a small subset of all potential relata that a learner has encountered, meaning even
the most sophisticated learner must lean on their broader beliefs for support.
In lower level cognition, inference takes place over simple quantities like magnitudes and is
certainly probabilistic in the sense that humans can achieve near optimal integration of noisy
signals in a variety of tasks including estimation (Miyazaki, Nozaki, & Nakajima, 2005) and
motor control (e.g. Ko¨rding & Wolpert, 2004). At the top end of higher level cognition we have
a global world-view, and explicit reasoning characterized by its single track nature. Rather
than claiming these are completely different processes (Evans, 2003), the approximate proba-
bilistic inference perspective can accommodate the whole continuum. At the lower level the
brain can average over many values, as in particle filtering (Abbott & Griffiths, 2011), with
a whole fleet of Neurath’s ships, or via lots of long chains (Gershman et al., 2012; Lieder et
al., 2012). In higher level cognition, however, the hypothesis space becomes increasingly un-
wieldy, and inference becomes increasingly approximate as it must rely on smaller fleets, i.e.,
fewer hypotheses, and more local alterations in the face of evidence. At the very top we have
a navy of one, grappling with a single global model that can only be updated incrementally.
It is worth noting that individuals can then play the role of particles again in group behavior
(Courville & Daw, 2007), giving us approximate inference all the way up.
In sum, retaining the Bayesian machinery is valuable even as it becomes degenerate, be-
cause it allows us to express heuristic behavior without resorting to separate process model or
abandoning close connections to an appropriate computational level understanding.
Scope of the theory
We modeled causal belief change as a process of gradually updating a single representation
through local, conditional edits. While we chose to focus on causal structure inference within
the causal Bayes net framework here, there is no reason why this approach should be limited to
this domain. By taking the Neurath’s ship metaphor to reveal an intuitive answer as to how peo-
ple sidestep the intractability of rational theory formation (van Rooij et al., 2014), we can start
to build more realistic models of how people generate the theories that they do and how and
why they get stuck. We might explain the induction and adaptation of many of the rich repre-
sentations utilized in cognition by analogous processes. Future work could explore the piece-
meal induction of models involving multinomial, continuous (Nodelman, Shelton, & Koller,
2002; Pacer & Griffiths, 2011) or latent variables (Lucas, Holstein, & Kemp, 2014); unrestricted
functional forms (Griffiths, Lucas, Williams, & Kalish, 2009); hierarchical organization (Grif-
fiths & Tenenbaum, 2009; Williamson & Gabbay, 2005); and temporal (Pacer & Griffiths, 2012)
and spatial (Battaglia, Hamrick, & Tenenbaum, 2013; Ullman et al., 2012; Ullman, Stuhlmu¨ller,
Goodman, & Tenenbaum, 2014) semantics. We are currently exploring the combination of pro-
duction rules (Goodman, Tenenbaum, Feldman, & Griffiths, 2008) and local search to model
discovery of new hypotheses in situations where the space of possibilities is theoretically infi-
nite. The sequential conditional re-evaluation process illustrated by our Neurath’s ship model
shows how this radical antifoundationalism need not be fatal for theory building in general.
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Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a new model of causal theory change, based on an old idea from
philosophy of science – that learners cannot maintain a distribution over all possible beliefs,
and so must rely on sequential local changes to a single representation when updating beliefs
to incorporate new evidence. We showed that we can provide a good account of participants’
sequences of judgments in three experiments and argued that our model offers a flexible candi-
date for explaining how complex representations can be formed in cognition. We also analyzed
participants’ information-gathering behavior, finding it consistent with the thesis that learners
focus on resolving manageable areas of local uncertainty rather than global uncertainty, show-
ing cognizance of their learning limitations. Together these accounts show how people manage
to construct rich, causally-structured representations through their interactions with a complex
noisy world.
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A Formal specification of the models
Representation and inference
A noisy-OR parametrized causal model m over variables X , with strength and background
parameters wS and wB assign a likelihood to each datum (a complete observation, or the out-
come of an intervention) d as the product of the probability of each variable that was not
intervened upon given the states of its parents
P (d|m,w) =
∏
x∈X P (x|dpa(x),w) (22)
P (x|dpa(x),w) = x+ (1− 2x)(1− wB)(1− wS)
∑
y∈pa(x) y (23)
where pa(x) denotes the parents of variable x in the causal model (see Figure 1 for an example).
We can thus compute the posterior probability of model m ∈M over a set of modelsM given
a prior P (M) and data D = {di} associated with interventions C = {ci}. We can condition on
wS and wB if known (e.g. in Experiment 1)
P (m|D,w) = P (D|m,w;C)P (m)∑
m′∈M P (D|m′,w;C)P (m′)
(24)
or else marginalize over their possible values (e.g. in Experiment 2)
P (m|D) =
∫
w
P (D|m,w;C)p(w)P (m) dw∑
m′∈M
∫
w
P (D|m′,w;C)p(w)P (m′) dw (25)
Intervention choice
The value of an intervention can be quantified relative to a notion of uncertainty. Here we
adopt Shannon entropy (Shannon, 1951), for which the uncertainty in a distribution over causal
models M is given by
H(M) = −
∑
m∈M
P (m) log2 P (m) (26)
Assuming w is known, let ∆H(M |d,w; c) refer to the reduction in uncertainty going from
prior P (M) to posterior P (M |d,w; c) after performing intervention c, then seeing data d
∆H(M |d,w; c) =
[
−
∑
m∈M
P (m) logP (m)
]
−
[
−
∑
m∈M
P (m|d,w; c) logP (m|d,w; c)
]
(27)
Given this objective, we can define the value of an intervention as the expected reduction in
uncertainty after seeing its outcome. To get the expectancy, we must average, prospectively,
over the different possible outcomes d ∈ Dc (where Dc is the space of possible outcomes of
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intervention c) weighted by their marginal likelihoods under the prior, giving
E
d∈Dc
[∆H(M |d,w; c)] =
∑
d∈Dc
(
∆H(M |d,w; c)
∑
m∈M
P (d|m,w; c)P (m)
)
(28)
For a greedily optimal sequence of interventions c1, . . . , ct, we take P (M |Dt−1,w;Ct−1) as
P (M) and P (M |Dt,w;Ct−1, ct) as P (M |d,w; c) in Equation 27. The most valuable interven-
tion at a given time point is then
ct = arg max
c∈C
E
d∈Dc
[
∆H(M |d, Dt−1,w;Ct−1, c)] (29)
If w is unknown, we must use the marginal distribution, replacing Equation 27 with
∆H(M |d; c) =
[
−
∑
m∈M
P (m) logP (m)
]
−
[
−
∑
m∈M
∫
w
P (m|d,w; c)p(w) dw log
∫
w
P (m|d,w; c)p(w) dw
]
(30)
An algorithmic-level model of sequential belief change
Let E be an adjacency matrix such that the upper triangle entries where Eij (if i < j ≤ N )
denotes the state of edge i− j in a causal model m. Any model m ∈M corresponds to a setting
for all Eij where i < j ≤ N , to one of three edge states e ∈ {1 : i → j, 0 : i = j, − 1 : i ← j}.
By starting with any hypothesis and iteratively sampling from the conditional distributions on
edge states P (Eij |E\ij ,Dtr,w; Ctr) (Goudie & Mukherjee, 2011) using the following equation:
P (Eij = e|E\ij ,Dtr,w; Ctr) =
P (Eij = e|E\ij ,Dtr,w; Ctr)∑
e′∈EijP (Eij = e′|E\ij ,Dtr,w; Ctr)
(31)
we can cheaply generate chains of dependent samples from P (M |Dtr,w; Ctr). This can be done
systematically (cycling through all edges ∈ i < j ≤ N ), or randomly selecting the next edge
sample with P ( 1|i,j| ) where |i, j| is the number of edges in the graph. Here we assume random
sampling for simplicity. Thus, on each step, the selectedEij is updated using the newest values
of E\ij .21 Specifically, we assume that after each new piece of evidence arrives:
1. The learner begins sampling with edges E(0)ij for all i and j set as they were in their
previous judgment bt−1.
2. They then randomly select an edge Eij in i < j ≤ N to update.
3. They resample E(1)ij using Equation 31.
4. If the search does not result in a new model they keep collecting evidence Dtr = {Dtr,dt},
c = {Ctr, ct}. If it does, the evidence is used up and forgotten, and they begin collecting
evidence again (e.g. resetting Dtr = {} and Ctr = {}).
5. The learner repeats steps 1 to 4 k times, with their final edge choices E(k) constituting
their new belief bt.
21Edge changes that would create a cyclic graph always have a probability of zero
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We assume for simplicity that b0, before any data has been seen is an unconnected graph,
but have tested this assumption by fitting the data from t=2 onward only finding better fits
overall and a stronger win for Neurath’s ship over the other models we consider.
Resampling, hill climbing or random change
We also consider generalizations of Equation 31 allowing transitions to be governed by
higher powers of P (Eij = e|E\ij ,Dtr,w; Ctr)
Pω(Eij = e|E\ij ,Dtr,w; Ctr) =
Pω(Eij = e|E\ij ,Dtr,w; Ctr)∑
e′∈Eij P
ω(Eij = e′|E\ij ,Dtr,w; Ctr)
(32)
yielding stronger preference for the most likely state of eij if ω > 1 and more random
sampling if ω < 1.
A distribution over search lengths
We assume that for each update, the learner’s length of search k is drawn from a Poisson
distribution with average λ ∈ [0,∞]
P (k) =
λke−λ
k!
(33)
Putting these together
To calculate the probability distribution of new belief bt given dt, bt−1 search behavior ω and
a chain of length k, we first construct the transition matrix Rωt for the Markov search chain by
averaging over the conditional distributions associated with the choice of each edge, weighted
by the probability of selecting that edge
Rωt =
∑
i<j≤N
Pω(Eij = e|E\ij ,Dtr,w; Ctr)×
1
|i, j| (34)
for each possible belief b.
By raising this transition matrix to the power k (i.e. some search length) and selecting the
row corresponding to starting belief [(Rωt )k]bt−1 , we get the probability of adopting eachm ∈M
as new belief bt (see Figure 2 for a visualization) at the end of the k length search
P (Bt|Dtr, bt−1, ω, k; Ctr) = [(Rωt )k]bt−1m (35)
Finally, by averaging over different possible chain lengths k, weighted by their probability
Poisson(λ) we get the marginal probability that a learner will move to each possible new belief
in B at t
P (Bt|Dtr, bt−1, ω, λ; Ctr) =
∞∑
0
λke−λ
k!
[(Rωt )
k]bt−1m (36)
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A local uncertainty schema
Edge focus
Relative to a focus on an edge Exy , intervention values were calculated using expected
information as in Appendix A, but assuming prior entropy as that of a uniform distribution
over the three possible edge states
H(Exy|E\xy) = −3
(
1
3
log2
1
3
)
(37)
and calculating posterior entropies for the possible outcomes d ∈ D using
H(Exy|E\xy,d,w; c) = −
∑
z∈{−1,0,1}
P (Exy = z|E\xy,d,w; c) log2 P (Exy = z|E\xy,d,w; c)
(38)
Effect focus entropy
Relative to a focus on the effects of variable x, intervention values were calculated using
expected information as in Appendix A but using prior entropy, calculated by partitioning a
uniform prior over models M into sets of models Mo(z) corresponding to each descendant set
z ⊆ De(x)
H(De(x)) = −
∑
z⊆De(x)
 ∑
m∈Mo(z)
1
|M |
 log2
 ∑
m∈Mo(z)
1
|M |
 (39)
Posterior entropies were then calculated by summing over probabilities of the the elements in
each Mo(z) for each z ⊆ De(x)
H(De(x)|d,w; c) = −
∑
z⊆De(x)
 ∑
m∈Mo(z)
P (m|d,w; c)
 log2
 ∑
m∈Mo(z)
P (m|d,w; c)
 (40)
Confirmation focus entropy
Relative to a focus on distinguishing current hypothesis bt from null hypothesis b0, inter-
vention values were calculated using expected information as above but prior entropy was
always based on a uniform prior over the two hypotheses
H({bt, b0}) = −2
(
1
2
log2
1
2
)
(41)
and posterior entropies were calculated using
H({bt, b0}|d,w; c) = −
∑
z∈{0,t}
P (bz|d,w; c)∑
z′∈{0,t} P (bz
′ |d,w; c) log2
P (bz|d,w; c)∑
z′∈{0,t} P (bz
′ |d,w; c) (42)
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B Additional modeling details
All models were fit using maximum likelihood. Maximum likelihood estimates were found
using Brent (for one parameter) or Nelder-Mead (for several parameters) optimization, as im-
plemented by R’s optim function. Convergence to global optima was checked by repeating all
optimizations with a range of randomly selected starting parameters.
k For averaging across different values of k in the belief models, we capped k at 50 and
renormalized the distribution such that P (k ≥ 0∧k ≤ 50) = 1. This made negligible difference
to the fits since the probabilities of P (Bt|dr, bt−1, ω, k; Ctr) for values of k  N (where N is the
number of variables) were very similar.
 To allow that participants are liable to occasionally lapse concentration or forget the out-
come of a test, we included a lapse parameter  – i.e., a parametric amount of decision noise
 ∈ [0, 1] – so that the probability of a belief would be a mixture of that predicted by the model
and uniform noise. This ensured that occasional random judgments did not have undue effects
on the other parameters of each model.
b0 We assume for simplicity that people’s starting belief, b0, before any data has been seen, is
an unconnected graph.
Marginalization
For all modeling in Experiment 3, we had to average over the unknown noise w. To do
this, we drew 1000 paired uniformly distributed wS and wB samples and averaged over these
when computing marginal likelihoods and posteriors. These marginal priors and posteriors
were used for computing expected information gain values.
Evaluating fits
Baseline acts as the null model for computing BIC’s (Schwarz, 1978) and pseudo-R2’s (Dob-
son, 2010) for all other models.
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